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CONFRONTING COVENTURERS: COCONSPIRATOR HEARSAY, SIR
WALTER RALEIGH, AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
Ben Trachtenberg
Abstract
Using the example of a recent major terrorism prosecution, this
Article addresses “coventurer hearsay” in the context of the ongoing
Confrontation Clause debate concerning the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington. Courts have recently
begun admitting hearsay evidence pursuant to a revisionist
interpretation of the coconspirator statement exception to the hearsay
rule. Under the new “lawful joint venture” theory, a hearsay statement
may be admitted as a coconspirator statement if made in furtherance of
a “joint undertaking”—defined as pretty much any cooperative
activity—even if the “conspiracy” is not illegal. Because this new
interpretation of an old hearsay exception cannot plausibly be described
as “firmly rooted” in American law, nor does the hearsay included in
the new exception bear “indicia of reliability,” coventurer hearsay
would have been inadmissible at criminal trials under pre-Crawford
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The overwhelming majority of
coventurer statements, however, are not “testimonial,” meaning that
current Confrontation Clause law does not prohibit their use against
criminal defendants. Accordingly, coventurer hearsay demonstrates that
defendants suffer prejudice from the Court’s reinterpretation of the
Sixth Amendment.
After reviewing evidence that the Crawford majority misinterpreted
the historical background of the Confrontation Clause, the Article
argues that the Court should reexamine whether the Confrontation
Clause, or perhaps the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, should be read to prohibit the admission of dangerously
unreliable hearsay against criminal defendants, even if such hearsay is
“nontestimonial.” The case of the Holy Land Foundation—in which the
United States government closed America’s largest Muslim charity and
convicted five leaders of funneling money to Hamas—provides a
concrete example of coventurer hearsay run amok. The prosecution case
relied heavily on “joint venture” hearsay, unreliable out-of-court
statements admissible only pursuant to a new interpretation of the
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coconspirator exception, a hearsay exception likely to have been found
unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence upended
by Crawford. The result exemplifies the injustice made possible by
recent case law and provides a new challenge to the testimonial theory
of confrontation law.
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I.

BAD HISTORY MAKES BAD CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ............ 1675
A. Rebutting Crawford’s “Law Office History” .............. 1677
B. The “So What?” Rejoinder ......................................... 1681

II.

BAD LAW IN BOOKS AND BAD LAW IN ACTION................... 1684
A. “Coventurer Hearsay”—An Exception Swallowing
the Rule ........................................................................ 1685
1. Why Courts Admit Coconspirator Statements
in the First Place ................................................... 1686
2. Why Courts Should Not Expand the Exception
to Include Lawful Ventures .................................. 1689
3. How the Revisionists are Wrong about Congress
and the Supreme Court ......................................... 1693
B. Crawford Admits Against Defendants Evidence
that Roberts Excluded ................................................. 1695
1. Today’s Constitution Will Not Save Us............... 1696
2. Yesterday’s Constitution Might Well Have
Saved Us............................................................... 1700
3. Will Tomorrow’s Constitution Save Us? ............. 1703

III.

ANSWERING THE “SO WHAT?” REJOINDER ......................... 1709
A. Historical Evidence Argues Against Admission
of Coventurer Hearsay ................................................ 1709
B. Modern Practice Shows the Evil of Admitting
Coventurer Hearsay .................................................... 1713

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1722
INTRODUCTION
Until it was closed by the United States Government in 2001, the
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) was a proPalestinian charitable organization headquartered outside of Dallas. It
was once the largest Muslim charity in the United States. After shutting
down HLF in December 2001, the United States tried five HLF leaders
for using the charity to funnel money to the terrorist group Hamas in
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violation of federal law.1 All five were eventually convicted.2 The HLF
prosecution raises several important issues related to the American
criminal justice system, especially with respect to how that system
handles cases related to terrorism.3 Among other evidence, prosecutors
presented to the jury selections from a trove of documents related to
Hamas; they contended that the documents “showed that HLF was a
fundraising arm . . . in support of Hamas.”4 Like most statements
recorded on paper, the documents were hearsay, and the defendants
objected to their admission as evidence. Based on a novel interpretation
of an ancient exception to the hearsay rule for coconspirator statements,
the trial court admitted the documents, and a three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit approved the
rulings in its opinion affirming the conviction.5 This Article explains
that these decisions not only represent a misreading of the Federal Rules
of Evidence but also starkly illustrate the flaws with recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
Since the Supreme Court upended its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington,6 scholars have vigorously
debated whether the Crawford majority or Chief Justice William
Rehnquist’s concurrence—or neither of them—accurately understood
the meaning of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”7 In addition, because the Crawford
1. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 485 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Laurie
Goodstein, U.S. Muslims Taken Aback by a Charity’s Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at
A23.
2. See Gretel C. Kovach, Five Convicted in Terrorism Financing Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2008, at A16 (“On their second try, federal prosecutors won sweeping convictions
Monday against five leaders of a Muslim charity in a retrial of the largest terrorism-financing
case in the United States since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.”).
3. See, e.g., El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 490 (evaluating whether use of witnesses known to
jury and defense only by pseudonyms violated Fifth and Sixth Amendments); id. at 516–17
(evaluating whether the district court was required to issue “letter rogatory” to help defendants
obtain evidence located in Israel); id. at 525 (determining what standard courts should use
during “harmless error” analysis).
4. Id. at 501.
5. Id. at 501–07. Defendants filed a petition seeking a writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court of the United States. See Petition for Writ of Certioari at i, Elashi v. United
States, No. 11-1390 (U.S. May 17, 2012) (listing two questions presented, one of which
concerns whether Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) “extends to out-of-court statements in
furtherance of a lawful joint venture”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Evidence in
Support of Petitioners, Elashi v. United States, No. 11-1390 (June 20, 2012). The Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, cert. denied sub nom. Elashi v.
United States, 2012 WL 1833933 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-1390), and 2012 WL 1835124
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-10437).
6. 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know
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regime both admits some evidence in criminal trials barred by the prior
doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts8 and excludes some evidence that had been
admissible under Roberts,9 scholars and practitioners have debated the
likely effect of the new constitutional doctrine. Would it help
defendants? Would it hurt them?
The Crawford Court held that only “testimonial” hearsay is barred
by the Confrontation Clause—that is, that a criminal trial court can
admit “nontestimonial” hearsay at will against defendants without
violating the Sixth Amendment. Testimonial hearsay comprises “formal
statement[s] to government officers,” such as affidavits, fruits of
interrogations, and other utterances that declarants reasonably expected
would be used for prosecutorial purposes.10
As a practical matter, the Crawford holding is limited by the
continuing existence of the hearsay rule. Because Federal Rule of
Evidence 802 and its state counterparts exclude most hearsay, the
absence of a constitutional prohibition of nontestimonial out-of-court
statements generally does not prejudice defendants. Indeed, Crawford
supporters have mentioned the lack of practical prejudice when
responding to Crawford’s critics. They argue in essence that even if
critics are correct about the majority opinion’s tenuous grasp on legal

It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 106–07 (2005)
[hereinafter Davies, Fictional Originalism]; Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian
Statutes: A Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 494 (2007); Thomas Y.
Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A Reply
to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 557 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Revisiting the Fictional
Originalism]; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 918–21 (2007); Richard D.
Friedman, Crawford and Davis: A Personal Reflection, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 303 (2007).
Professor Friedman enjoys the distinction of having been for Crawford before the case was even
presented. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation as a Hot Topic: The Virtues of Going
Back to Square One, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2003) (“If a person makes a
testimonial statement, that statement cannot be introduced against an accused unless the accused
has had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the person, face to face and under oath.”); see
also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (citing Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998)).
8. 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980); see also Lynn McLain, “I’m Going to Dinner with
Frank”: Admissibility of Nontestimonial Statements of Intent to Prove the Actions of Someone
Other Than the Speaker—and the Role of the Due Process Clause, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 373,
376 (2010).
9. For example, after Crawford, the Court has held that certain business records may not
be admitted against a criminal defendant absent cross-examination of the author (regardless of
hearsay law that would allow admission of the records at a civil trial). See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (holding that without the testimony of the
person who performed the test, the admission of a chemical drug test report violated the
Confrontation Clause).
10. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–53.
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history, so what? Debate has mostly shifted to questions of what
precisely should count as testimonial under the new regime.11
This Article addresses “coventurer hearsay” in the context of the
ongoing Crawford debate. Courts have recently begun admitting
hearsay evidence pursuant to a revisionist interpretation of the
coconspirator statement exception to the hearsay rule.12 Under the new
theory, a hearsay statement may be admitted as a coconspirator
statement if made in furtherance of a “joint venture”—defined as pretty
much any cooperative activity—even if the “conspiracy” is not illegal.13
Under the traditional reading, the exception covered only statements
made in furtherance of illegal objectives. Coventurer hearsay would
have been inadmissible at criminal trials under pre-Crawford
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because this new interpretation of
an old hearsay exception cannot plausibly be described as “firmly
rooted” in American law,14 nor does the hearsay included in the
expanded exception bear “indicia of reliability,”15 as was required by
the Roberts regime.16 Post-Crawford, however, the overwhelming
majority of coventurer statements are not testimonial, meaning that
current Confrontation Clause law does not prohibit their use against
11. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Is a Forensic Laboratory Report Identifying a
Substance as a Narcotic “Testimonial”?, PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 76, 77–78 (2008)
(previewing Melendez-Diaz); George M. Tsiatis, Putting Melendez-Diaz on Ice: How Autopsy
Reports Can Survive the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 85 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 355, 357 (2011); see also Amanda Harris, Note, Surpassing Sentencing: The
Controversial Next Step in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1447 (2012)
(discussing Crawford’s implications for confrontation in capital sentencing).
12. The Federal version of the coconspirator exception is codified at Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). For state equivalents, see, for example, Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906,
915 (Fla. 2000) (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(e) (1997)); People v. Goodman, 408 N.E.2d
215, 216 (Ill. 1980); Commonwealth v. Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Mass. 1998). In keeping
with historical usage, I prefer the term “exception”—rather than “exemption” or “exclusion”—
when referring to the coconspirator hearsay exception. The word choice has no substantive
significance. See generally Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay”
Classification: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1
(2011); see also Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (discussing “co-conspirator
exception”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 (discussing “hearsay exceptions” such as the one that
covers “statements in furtherance of a conspiracy”).
13. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 502 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Although the rule
speaks of statements made in furtherance of a ‘conspiracy,’ we have recognized that
admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not turn on the criminal nature of the
endeavor. . . . Instead, a statement may be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if it is made in
furtherance of a lawful joint undertaking.”); United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); see also Ben Trachtenberg, Coconspirators, “Coventurers,” and the Exception
Swallowing the Hearsay Rule, 61 HASTINGS L. J. 581, 583 (2010).
14. See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813–14 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980).
15. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
16. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
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criminal defendants.17 Accordingly, coventurer hearsay provides an
example of how defendants can suffer prejudice from the Court’s
reinterpretation of the Sixth Amendment.
In addition to being a kind of hearsay that would have been
prohibited under Roberts and is now admissible under Crawford,18
coventurer hearsay is a kind of hearsay uncannily like the hearsay used
to condemn Sir Walter Raleigh, the Englishman whose trial19 received
so much attention from the Crawford Court. As others have observed,20
the statements of the “Portuguese gentleman” admitted against Raleigh
were nontestimonial. There is every reason to believe that the authors
and ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment were aware of such testimony and
intended the Confrontation Clause to prohibit its use against criminal
defendants.21 The traditional coconspirator statement exception already
rests on shaky ideological grounds, remaining part of evidence law
largely on the ground of “necessity.”22 The revisionist exception cannot
appeal even to tradition, nor can its proponents argue that “coventurers”
have brought their problems upon themselves by their bad conduct, a
common justification for admission of coconspirator statements.23
Coventurer hearsay demonstrates the shortcomings of Crawford and
illustrates the need for continuing reconsideration of the new
Confrontation Clause regime. Commentators have proposed various
solutions to Crawford’s apparent problems, including invocation of the
Due Process Clause to bar certain nontestimonial hearsay.24 Using the
17. See infra Subsection II.B.1. Before Crawford, the Court’s Confrontation Clause cases
did not turn on whether a statement was testimonial.
18. At least in those jurisdictions adopting the revisionist understanding of the
coconspirator exception. I continue to argue that the revisionist take is simply mistaken as a
matter of evidence law.
19. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 1, 25 (1603).
20. See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 318–19 (2005) (noting
the significant nontestimonial hearsay implicating Raleigh).
21. See Michael L. Seigel & Daniel Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator
Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 882 (2007) (citing 30
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6345 n.507 (Supp. 2006) (setting forth a letter from George Mason)).
22. See infra Subsection II.A.1.
23. See infra Subsections II.A.2–3. A theory of just deserts undergirds the exemption of
all “party admissions” from the Hearsay Rule. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (defining as “not
hearsay” categories of statements including a party’s own statement, adoptive admissions,
statements by spokespersons, statements by a party’s agent or employee, and coconspirator
statements). For example, the saying goes that a party will not be heard to complain of the
admission of his own statement; in other words, he said it, so he can explain himself to the jury.
Similarly, a theory akin to the tort doctrine of respondeat superior justifies the admission of
employee statements against employers.
24. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Avoiding a Confrontation?: How Courts Have Erred in
Finding that Nontestimonial Hearsay is Beyond the Scope of the Bruton Doctrine, 77 BROOK. L.
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Holy Land Foundation case, this Article provides a concrete example of
why such reconsideration is necessary to avoid injustice. The Crawford
line of cases does not merely rest on inaccurate “law office history.” In
at least some cases, the new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
will allow the admission of unreliable hearsay into criminal trials,
undercutting the purpose of the Sixth Amendment and increasing the
risk of wrongful convictions.
I. BAD HISTORY MAKES BAD CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Scholars, along with dissenting Justices, have long complained of
the “law office history” occasionally used to justify Supreme Court
decisions construing much-disputed constitutional provisions.25 For
example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court denied the existence of “a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy” and grounded its decision on historical analysis.26 Seventeen
years later, the Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas,
acknowledging the mediocre historiography of Bowers.27 “In summary,
the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the
majority opinion [by Justice Byron White] and the concurring opinion
by Chief Justice [Warren] Burger indicate. Their historical premises are
not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”28 In other
words, the Bowers majority wanted to reach a certain result—that is, to
uphold the Georgia sodomy statute before it—and it quoted historical
sources to provide a plausible justification for the preordained
decision.29
Not all reversals of constitutional doctrine represent a
reinterpretation of constitutional history, however. When interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1896, the
REV. 625, 633, 635 (2012).
25. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523–29 (1995); Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 387, 405–07 (2003).
26. 478 U.S. 186, 192–95 (1986). The dissents by Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice
John Paul Stevens challenge the majority’s historical interpretations. E.g., id. at 215 & n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that contrary to the majority’s claim, ancient statutes cited
in the majority opinion did not show longstanding disapproval of homosexual activity but rather
disapproval of certain sexual acts, even among husband and wife).
27. 539 U.S. 558, 567–68 (2003) (“In academic writings, and in many of the scholarly
amicus briefs filed to assist the Court in this case, there are fundamental criticisms of the
historical premises relied upon by the majority and concurring opinions in Bowers.”).
28. Id. at 571.
29. Such judicial behavior is no surprise to students of legal realism. See, e.g., Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820
(1935) (“[O]ne may suspect that a court would not consistently hide behind a barrage of
transcendental nonsense if the grounds of its [due process] decisions were such as could be
presented without shame to the public.”).
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Court in Plessy v. Ferguson justified its result—upholding a Louisiana
statute “providing for separate railway carriages for the white and
colored races”—with historical interpretation.30 Noting that courts had
long upheld segregated schools and bans of interracial marriage, the
Court rejected the idea that the “object of the amendment” included
banning segregated trains.31 In 1954, the Court overruled Plessy in
Brown v. Board of Education, holding that the Plessy Court lacked the
psychological and other knowledge necessary to understand the
pernicious effects of “separate but equal” schools.32 Despite the
rejection of Plessy’s holding, the Brown Court did not dispute Plessy’s
history. The Plessy Court was correct when it noted that segregated
schools existed before the Fourteenth Amendment, existed immediately
after the Amendment’s ratification, and endured in 1896.33 Brown
rejected the idea that this history was consistent with the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not that it had occurred.
While Crawford v. Washington surely lacks the historic resonance
of Brown or Lawrence, those landmark cases can help commentators
situate Crawford among other instances of the Supreme Court’s reversal
of constitutional doctrine. When the Supreme Court overrules a prior
decision that construed a constitutional provision, it may explain its
decision with an appeal to justice, as was seen in Brown. Irrespective of
decades of segregation following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that the rule of Plessy could stand no more.
30. 163 U.S. 537, 540, 544 (1896) (“The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where
they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to
the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of
the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.”).
31. Id. at 548–49.
32. 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (“‘Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive
them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.’
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”) (citations omitted); see also Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of
Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause.”).
33. It should be noted, however, that even when Plessy was decided, there were those who
saw the decision as a retreat from a prior understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, one that
prohibited racial segregation. See, e.g., Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–08 (1879). Accordingly, Plessy can fairly be described as
having support in neither history nor justice.
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In Lawrence, by contrast, the Court attacked the Bowers precedent on
two fronts: one of history and one of justice. The Lawrence majority
rejected the Bowers Court’s appeal to history, as we have seen. It also
rejected the Bowers result as unjust: “Its continuance as precedent
demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”34
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford attempts a
similar two-front attack on the Ohio v. Roberts Court’s Confrontation
Clause interpretation. Crawford rejects the historical interpretation in
Roberts as not “faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause,”35 and also chides the discarded precedent as “a fundamental
failure on [the Court’s] part to interpret the Constitution in a way that
secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.”36 The remainder
of this Part argues that the historical analysis in Crawford is not
accurate, thereby undermining the first prong of the anti-Roberts attack.
The next Part addresses the Crawford majority’s appeal to justice.
A. Rebutting Crawford’s “Law Office History”
The Crawford majority faced immediate criticism of its historical
analysis. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurrence
to question reasoning he deemed not “sufficiently persuasive . . . to
overrule long-established precedent.”37 Scholarly opprobrium promptly
followed in Rehnquist’s footsteps, providing further evidence of the
majority’s error.38 For example, Professor Randolph Jonakait examined
the 1828 American Dictionary by Noah Webster from which the
Crawford majority gleaned its original understanding of the word
“witness.”39 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him,” and Justice Scalia found in Webster’s a
definition of witness that supported his testimonial theory of the
Confrontation Clause.40 That definition concerned those who “bear
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
35. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (“Members of this Court and
academics have suggested that we revise our doctrine to reflect more accurately the original
understanding of the Clause.”).
36. Id. at 67.
37. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“The Court’s distinction between testimonial
and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history than our
current doctrine.”).
38. See generally GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 587–93 (2d ed. 2008) (reviewing scholarly
responses to the Crawford Court’s “Contested Originalism”).
39. Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v.
Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006); see
also Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of its Common Law Background,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 337 (1991).
40. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“It applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other
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testimony,” which might support the conclusion that only testimonial
statements are covered by a provision concerning witnesses. In addition
to that definition, however, Professor Jonakait discovered another
potentially relevant definition: “A person who knows or sees any thing;
one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness.”41
Accordingly, it is far from obvious that “witness” in the Confrontation
Clause refers only to those who give testimony, and accordingly far
from obvious that all nontestimonial hearsay resides beyond the scope
of the Sixth Amendment.
In addition to plumbing the depths of ancient dictionaries, scholars
have revealed more substantive errors in the Crawford opinion. First,
hearsay law remained largely unsettled at the time of ratification,
making it difficult to believe that the authors and ratifiers of the Sixth
Amendment gave serious thought to the various classes of hearsay
identified in modern blackletter evidence law.42 As Professor Thomas
Davies wrote, lawyers in 1791 practiced in courts far less hospitable to
informal hearsay than do modern practitioners.43 Much of the
nontestimonial hearsay now deemed outside the scope of the Sixth
Amendment was certainly inadmissible at ratification-era criminal
trials.44 In addition, certain testimonial hearsay (such as witness
statements gathered by justices of the peace pursuant to Marian statutes)
was admissible at ratification-era criminal trials in England and
America, even though such statements fall within the definition of
testimonial hearsay set forth in Crawford.45 The leading defender of
Crawford’s historical analysis, Robert Kry, cannot support the Court’s
claim that ratification-era criminal courts allowed the admission of
nontestimonial hearsay against defendants—or that such hearsay would
words, those who bear testimony. ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically [a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted).
41. See Jonakait, supra note 39, at 159; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing other Webster’s definition of witness in pre-Crawford
dissent).
42. See Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 7, at 106–07. But see Kry, supra note 7,
at 495–97. The unsettled nature of hearsay law in 1791 raises a concern familiar to critics of
“originalist” analysis, which is that one cannot discern what the Framers thought about X when
X was largely unknown to the Framers, whoever they were. Did Madison mean for the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause to apply to the Internet? Was “chemical castration” a form of
“cruel and unusual punishment” to those voting for ratification of the Eighth Amendment? (To
be fair, originalists have put forth answers to questions like these. A broad assessment of the
project of “original meaning” and “original understanding” is well beyond the scope of this
Article, which will confine its analysis of the Crawford Court’s originalism to whether it got the
history right in the first place.)
43. See Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 7, at 119.
44. Id. at 107, 119; Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism, supra note 7, at 561–62.
45. Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 7, at 108.
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not have concerned the authors and ratifiers of the Confrontation
Clause.46
In short, the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, although
light on historical analysis, has been vindicated.47 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist correctly noted, the hearsay rejected by the Crawford
majority as offensive to the Sixth Amendment—Sylvia Crawford’s
unsworn statements to police—could easily have been stricken under
the Roberts regime.48 After an intermediate appellate court vacated
Michael Crawford’s conviction on the ground that Sylvia’s statement
was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme
Court of Washington reinstated the conviction, “unanimously
concluding that, although Sylvia’s statement did not fall under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness.”49
Unless the state supreme court was correct—that is, unless the
intermediate appellate court was wrong to vacate the conviction
pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s teaching in Roberts and its
progeny—there was no need in Crawford to devise a new interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment.50
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist was not a historian and was not
pretending with his opinion to produce a scholarly treatise on the
Confrontation Clause. Nonetheless, despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
belief that no sweeping review of confrontation law was required by the
case before the Court, his concurrence certainly included sufficient
discussion of the relevant history to raise serious questions about the
majority’s analysis.51 Although reasonable persons may disagree about
46. See Kry, supra note 7, at 494; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’
Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford–Davis
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y
349, 354 (2007).
47. I mean no criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist in the characterization of his
concurrence as light on historical analysis. Indeed, this Article might fairly be so described
because I have sufficient respect for the historical analyses cited herein that I see no need to
recreate them.
48. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (“Petitioner Michael Crawford stabbed
a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia. At his trial, the State played for the jury
Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing, even though he had no
opportunity for cross-examination.”); see also id. at 69, 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting
that the decision “to overrule long-established precedent . . . [was] by no means necessary to
decide the present case”).
49. Id. at 41.
50. As the concurrence put it, “A citation to Idaho v. Wright, [497 U.S. 805, 820–24
(1990)], would suffice.” Id. at 76.
51. See id. at 70 (citing King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789), for its
proposition “that a statement taken by a justice of the peace may not be admitted into evidence
unless taken under oath” and accordingly demonstrating that testimonial hearsay was sometimes
admissible).
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whether the “indicia of reliability” and “firmly rooted” rubrics of Ohio
v. Roberts were working fine (albeit annoying to deal with) or were
instead a jumble of inconsistent decisions causing needless hassles in
the trial and appellate courts (not to mention occasional injustices), the
historical arguments in favor of scrapping the Roberts regime on the
basis of originalism cannot withstand scrutiny.
In particular, scholars have noted the confused treatment by the
Crawford majority of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.52 Raleigh’s trial
received substantial attention from the majority, which invoked
Raleigh’s name nineteen times. Describing the trial as one of the “most
notorious instances of civil-law examination,” the Court reported that
one of the “trial judges later lamented that ‘the justice of England has
never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir
Walter Raleigh.’”53 The Court described the injustice as follows: “Lord
Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an
examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh’s trial,
these were read to the jury.”54 Few would dispute that the admission of
Cobham’s testimonial statements caused great unfair prejudice to
Raleigh, nor is there a clamor supporting admission of out-of-court
statements such as these in modern America.
As others have observed, however, the Court’s intense attention on
Raleigh somehow ignores the other infamous hearsay admitted against
Raleigh, hearsay that falls outside the Crawford Court’s concept of
testimonial. Professor Myrna Raeder reminds readers that “Cobham’s
hearsay was not the only out-of-court statement introduced at Sir Walter
Raleigh’s trial.”55 She then asks, “Shouldn’t we be concerned about the
statements of the pilot, Dyer, who repeated what a Portuguese
gentleman had told him about the King never being crowned, because
Raleigh and Cobham were going to cut his throat?”56 The Crawford
majority has no answer, at least not one grounded in history. It is
possible, of course, for one to argue based on a close reading of the
Sixth Amendment that statements like those of the Portuguese
gentleman are not those of a “witness” “against” a criminal defendant
and accordingly are not barred by the Confrontation Clause. Crawford,
however, purports to issue a new interpretation of a constitutional
provision that vindicates what the text has meant since 1791—thereby
52. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 20, at 318–19; Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require That Roberts Had to
Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 689 (2007).
53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (quoting 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 487 (1832)).
54. Id.
55. Raeder, supra note 20, at 318; see infra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
56. Raeder, supra note 20, at 318–19; see also The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2
HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 1, 25 (1603); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100–01 (1972).
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correcting two centuries of Supreme Court inattention—and the
opinion’s historical analysis rests substantially on a single “infamous”
trial well known to the Framers, who presumably wished to outlaw the
trial’s procedures. It is odd indeed that the new definition of prohibited
evidence would, if applied to Raleigh, have solved only about half of
his infamous hearsay problem.
By omitting discussion of the ship pilot, Dyer, the Crawford
majority opinion likely misunderstands the motivations of the authors
and ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment. It is entirely believable that
Raleigh’s trial was understood in colonial America as a terrible injustice
that should not be repeated in the new United States. Accordingly, a
new take on confrontation law that prohibited “Raleigh-style
hearsay”—or otherwise analyzed the mistreatment of Raleigh and
ensured that American defendants suffered no similar injustices—might
make sense as an originalist project. Crawford’s new distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, however, fails even as
a clever thought experiment because the majority could not be bothered
to confront the relevant history.57
B. The “So What?” Rejoinder
Notwithstanding the robust historical criticism, scholarship has so
far been light on examples of how the Crawford rule will admit out-ofcourt statements against criminal defendants that (1) would have been
barred by Roberts and (2) violate the true meaning of the Sixth
Amendment (as opposed to the testimonial hearsay meaning announced
by the Crawford majority).58 In other words, the question presented
concerns the practical effect of the new Confrontation Clause regime:
Just what actual problems will it cause? Real-life examples are difficult
to find because the hearsay rule bars (as a matter of ordinary evidence
law, not through the Constitution) a great deal of hearsay, regardless of
what the Sixth Amendment says.
For example, imagine that Amy is in line at the bank and that Barry
runs in and robs the bank. As it happens, Amy recognizes Barry as the
childhood friend of Amy’s son, Charlie. That evening Amy calls
Charlie and says: “Did you hear about the bank robbery downtown
today? I was there, and I saw the robber. It was your friend, Barry, from
57. I do not dispute that the exclusion of testimonial hearsay might well be justified by
either the language of the Confrontation Clause or by appeals to substantial justice, as Professor
Friedman has powerfully argued. The appeal to justice is discussed in the next Part. I will note
for now that even if one agrees that no testimonial hearsay should be admitted, it does not
necessarily follow that all nontestimonial hearsay should fall outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause, much less that all such hearsay should be admissible.
58. “True meaning” here stands in for whatever a given commentator believes the
Confrontation Clause should do, for whatever reason she believes it.
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grade school. What a weird world.” At the subsequent bank robbery
trial of Barry, Amy would probably be a great witness for the
prosecution. If, however, Amy drops dead of a heart attack before trial,
the prosecution might wish to call Charlie as a substitute, to testify
about his conversation with Amy in the aftermath of the robbery. The
statement would not be testimonial because Amy’s statement was not a
solemn declaration intended to prove some fact; it was casual chatter.59
Under Crawford, therefore, the Confrontation Clause would present no
obstacle to Charlie’s testimony. But such testimony would, of course, be
hearsay.60 Charlie would be testifying about Amy’s out-of-court
statement, and the statement would be offered as proof of the matter
asserted—that Barry robbed the bank. Absent some highly-unusual
hearsay exception operating in the jurisdiction in which this
hypothetical robbery occurred, Charlie’s testimony would be excluded
by the hearsay rule, regardless of what the United States Supreme Court
does to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
The divergent results of the hearsay analysis and Sixth Amendment
analysis should come as no surprise. Everyone agrees that the hearsay
rule and the Sixth Amendment do not cover identical universes of
statements, and this has been settled blackletter evidence law since well
before Crawford.61 An utterance can be barred by neither the hearsay
rule nor the Confrontation Clause,62 barred by both of them,63 barred
only by the Confrontation Clause,64 or barred only by the hearsay rule.65
Indeed, the very purpose of the Roberts “indicia of reliability” and
“firmly rooted” tests was to ensure that the Confrontation Clause
prevented the admission of certain evidence at criminal trials,
59. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.”).
60. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
61. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 131–34 & nn.193–97 (1998); KENNETH S. BROUN, EVIDENCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 801 (2002); PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
319 (1999); see generally FISHER, supra note 38, at 567–68.
62. Such statements are admissible at criminal and civil trials, assuming they are
otherwise proper evidence.
63. Such statements are inadmissible at civil and criminal trials.
64. Such statements are admissible at civil trials, are admissible at criminal trials against
the prosecution, and are inadmissible against criminal defendants. If we assume that the
Supreme Court of Washington correctly interpreted the state’s own hearsay law when it
approved the admission of Sylvia Crawford’s statements at her husband’s criminal trial, these
statements fall into this category. In other words, the statements could properly be used against
Michael Crawford in Washington at a civil trial, at which the Confrontation Clause does not
apply.
65. Such statements are inadmissible at civil and criminal trials. Charlie’s testimony about
his mother’s statements falls into this category.
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irrespective of the rules of evidence.66 If a newer hearsay exception (not
firmly rooted in American law) admitted evidence of questionable
probative value (lacking sufficient indicia of reliability), legislatures and
courts were nonetheless free to adopt the hearsay exception and admit
the evidence for use at civil trials and for defendants’ use at criminal
trials. But under the Roberts interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
such evidence could not be offered against defendants at criminal trials.
The general principle that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule
cover different sets of statements remains the same under Crawford.
Only the identity of the statements covered by the Confrontation Clause
has changed.
Accordingly, someone who might be outraged were Charlie to
testify against Barry at a post-Crawford criminal trial will not actually
have occasion to become upset, for the hearsay rule will preclude any
need to consider a constitutional bar of Charlie’s testimony. If a
commentator uses this example to illustrate the problem with
Crawford—that is, to argue that Crawford must be wrong because it
would allow Charlie to testify against Barry in a way that seems unjust
and also seems contrary to the spirit of the Confrontation Clause—the
Crawford defense team has a ready response: “So what? Yes, it might
be sad if, in the aftermath of Crawford, the terrible injustices of your
paranoid fantasies were plaguing courtrooms across this great land. But
in reality, the good sense embodied in the rules of evidence prevents the
wrongs you fear.”
In addition to largely theoretical arguments about terrible evidence
that Crawford would not bar from criminal trials,67 Crawford skeptics
present practical complaints about useful evidence—formerly
admissible under Roberts—that prosecutors now cannot use.68
Particular attention has been devoted to domestic violence cases, both
by scholars and by Justices dissenting in post-Crawford cases.69 These
complaints suggest that Crawford’s scope is too broad, that it is
overinclusive in defining hearsay properly barred by the Confrontation
66. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004) (“[W]e once again reject the
view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, and that
its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon ‘the law of Evidence
for the time being.’”) (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923));
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (holding that admission of hearsay allowed under
state evidence law violated Confrontation Clause); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393, n.5
(1986).
67. “What if a state were to abolish the hearsay rule entirely? What then?”
68. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v.
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115,
118 (2010).
69. E.g., id. at 147; Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 379–80 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 380–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Clause. In response, the Crawford proponents enjoy the opportunity to
flaunt their fidelity to principle. Writing for the majority in Giles v.
California, Justice Scalia appeared shocked (shocked!) that his
colleagues would consider watering down a constitutional command in
the service of convenience:
[W]e are puzzled by the dissent’s decision to devote its
peroration to domestic-abuse cases. Is the suggestion that
we should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the
Framers adopted and Crawford described) for all other
crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for
those crimes that are frequently directed against women?
Domestic violence is an intolerable offense that legislatures
may choose to combat through many means—from
increasing criminal penalties to adding resources for
investigation and prosecution to funding awareness and
prevention campaigns. But for that serious crime, as for
others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants is not in the State’s arsenal.70
Such Sixth Amendment flag waving may ring a bit hollow when one
reviews the Supreme Court’s many compromises on matters of criminal
procedure.71 No matter. The overinclusivity position is raised only to
demonstrate that not all Crawford critics argue on behalf of criminal
defendants.
II. BAD LAW IN BOOKS AND BAD LAW IN ACTION
The remainder of this Article will attend to hearsay evidence that (1)
Roberts likely would have excluded from criminal trials, (2) Crawford
very likely will not exclude, and (3) certainly ought to be excluded. This
Part presents a real-life example of hearsay evidence that likely would
have been barred under Roberts and has been admitted under
Crawford—coventurer hearsay. After examining a new revisionist take
on the coconspirator statement exception to the hearsay rule, this Part
explains how Confrontation Clause jurisprudence under Roberts likely
would have prevented the introduction of coventurer hearsay against
criminal defendants, whereas Crawford and its progeny strongly suggest
that the Supreme Court now perceives no constitutional bar to the
70. 554 U.S. at 376.
71. Consider, for example, the many exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, see, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas,
J., concurring); the principle that undercover agents are not conducting “interrogations” for
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,
295–98 (1990); the inapplicability of Miranda at ordinary traffic stops, see Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439–40 (1984); and countless other doctrines.
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admission of such evidence. Using a recent terrorism financing case,
this Part then illustrates how unreliable, constitutionally-suspect
evidence has begun infecting criminal trials of tremendous importance.
A. “Coventurer Hearsay”—An Exception Swallowing the Rule
Pursuant to the coconspirator statement exception to the hearsay
rule, a statement is admissible as evidence against a party—even if the
statement otherwise satisfies the definition of hearsay72—if it “was
made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.”73 Variations of this formulation have appeared in evidence
treatises and cases for centuries.74 Case report after case report tells of
efforts to admit the hearsay statement of a declarant against a party,
with courts debating one or more of the following questions: (1) were
the declarant and the party in a conspiracy when the statement was
made, and (2) if so, was the statement made in furtherance of the
conspiracy? 75 The opinions do not, however, spend much time
considering whether the word “conspiracy” refers only to unlawful joint
activity, or instead refers broadly to all joint enterprises, whether legal
or illegal. This oversight—the question seems simply not to have been
raised, perhaps because the word “conspiracy” so clearly implies
illegality to readers learned in the law—has opened the door to recent
mischief. Seizing upon seemingly helpful strands of dicta and confused
readings of both legislative history and Supreme Court precedent,
prosecutors have been arguing that the coconspirator statement
exception to the hearsay rule extends well beyond the common meaning
of conspiracy and allows the admission of statements made in
furtherance of perfectly lawful, even laudable, ventures.76 Federal
72. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”).
73. Id. 801(d)(2)(E).
74. E.g., 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AND
DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 402 (P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson eds.,
3d American ed. 1830).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F.3d 32, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 154 (U.S. 2010). The requirements are sometimes stated as the “pendency
requirement” (the statement must be made during the pendency of the conspiracy) and the “in
furtherance requirement.” Occasionally a source states that three requirements must be satisfied:
(1) existence of the conspiracy, (2) pendency, and (3) in furtherance. Because “pendency” and
“in furtherance” imply the existence of a conspiracy, the analysis and results are identical under
either formulation.
76. See, e.g., Letter Reply Brief of United States at 1, United States v. Schiff, 538 F.
Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J. 2008) (Crim. No. 06-406) (“The defendant’s main contention is that the
conspiracy or joint venture shown for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) must
have as its object an unlawful purpose. The law, however, is to the contrary.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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courts, instead of rejecting this dangerous deformation of evidence law,
have embraced it.77
The scope of the revisionist exception is even broader than the term
“coventurer hearsay” might imply. If the new rule applied only to true
“joint venturers” as those words are used in agency and partnership law
or other substantive law governing organizations, the revisionist version
of the coconspirator exception would be largely superfluous. Evidence
law already includes a hearsay exception for the statements of a party’s
agent or employee concerning matters related to the agency or
employment relationship.78 That rule has been applied to admit the
statements of business partners against one another, so long as the
statements were made in furtherance of the partnership.79 The joint
venturer exception (or coventurer exception), however, has been held to
cover statements in furtherance of “common goals” or “plans” lacking
anything close to the formality of a legal partnership.80
1. Why Courts Admit Coconspirator Statements in the First Place
To understand the harmful nature of the revisionist take on the
coconspirator statement exception, it helps to review the justification for
the traditional version of the exception. Four primary arguments are
advanced to justify the admission of coconspirator hearsay: (1) an
analogy to agency theory, (2) an analogy to “verbal acts” or res gestae,
(3) an assertion that coconspirator hearsay is reliable in a way similar to
statements within other hearsay exceptions, and (4) an appeal to
necessity, claiming that without such evidence many conspirators would
go unpunished.81 The first three arguments withstand little scrutiny,
leaving the appeal to necessity as the primary justification for the
traditional coconspirator exception. Accordingly, traditional evidence
law tolerates the admission of not-especially-reliable hearsay because
77. See supra note 13. But see Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012). In Smith, the
Seventh Circuit cited approvingly to lawful “joint venture” cases, see id. at 904, but then held
that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not apply to the challenged statements because the proponent of the
evidence could not prove that the hearsay declarant and the party against whom the hearsay was
offered “shared a common unlawful motive.” Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
78. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 305 Fed. Appx. 705, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1523–24 (5th Cir. 1992).
80. See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text; see also Government’s Trial
Memorandum at 15–16, United States v. Bruno (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CR-029) (arguing that
because the criminal defendant had entered lawful contracts with various entities, “documents of
those entities, as well as oral statements made by their representatives, are admissible pursuant
to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) as co-conspirator statements”).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 105 F.3d 770, 775 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The most that
can be said is that the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is of long standing and makes a
difficult-to-detect crime easier to prove.”).
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that evidence helps lock up criminals. Further, the party against whom
such evidence is used can be said to have brought his fate upon himself
by joining the conspiracy in the first place.82
Consider the first justification for the exception, though: the agency
analogy. In the agency analogy, the argument goes that because each
conspirator is the agent of every other member of the conspiracy, the
words of one may properly be used against all.83 The biggest problem
with the analogy is that it misstates agency law. One might sensibly
argue that a “corner boy” slinging illegal drugs is the “agent” of the
drug kingpin for whom he works, but no one who understands agency
law would argue that the kingpin is concurrently the agent of the lowlevel seller.84 Yet the agency analogy requires such a belief. Otherwise,
it cannot explain why the traditional coconspirator statement exception
goes in two directions, allowing the statements of servants to be used
against their masters and those of masters to be used against their
servants.85 In addition, the analogy ignores the existence of an
independent hearsay exception covering the statements of agents and
employees, allowing such statements to be used against principals and
employers.86 Indeed, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
explicitly acknowledged that the agency analogy is “at best a fiction.”87
The verbal acts (or res gestae) analogy, the second justification,
fares little better. The theory goes that because actions taken in
furtherance of a conspiracy are criminal in nature, coconspirator
statements are not hearsay at all but instead are verbal acts one might
analogize to the words: “By the authority vested in me, you are hereby
married,” or “I accept your offer.”88 The acceptance of an offer is not
offered for its truth. To decide a question of contract formation, the jury
needs to know only that someone said she accepted the offer, not what
she really believed.
82. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
83. See, e.g., Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926).
84. The best argument for this theory is that the corner boy and kingpin have joined a
“partnership in crime,” making each responsible for the words and deeds of the other. See id.
This too, however, is a weak analogy because coconspirators are not really “partners” as that
term is understood in partnership law. The state punishes conspirators for the substantive crimes
of their fellow criminals, see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1964), not because they
are truly partners but instead because they should have known better than to join a conspiracy.
85. See United States v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming defendant’s
conviction where defendant was convicted of conspiracy after helping to count and launder
money, based on out-of-court coconspirator statements by the “principal” in the “major cocaine
trafficking conspiracy”); 4 STEVEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL § 801.02(6)(f)–(g) (8th ed. 2002).
86. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
87. Id. 801 (advisory committee note).
88. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975) (examining speech acts).
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Similarly, to return to conspiracies, if a person says, “Yes, I will
help you murder the old man and steal his money,” the statement itself
could be proof of the element of agreement in a conspiracy prosecution.
No subsequent murder is necessary for a conviction. Because, however,
a statement offered into evidence as proof of verbal acts is not offered
“to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement,” verbal-act
evidence is not hearsay at all.89 And if an out-of-court statement does
not fall within the definition of hearsay, then no hearsay exception is
necessary to use it as evidence. The res gestae theory is therefore
internally contradictory. If coconspirator statements are res gestae and
accordingly are not hearsay, why then did the authors of the Federal
Rules of Evidence include a special hearsay exception to allow
coconspirator statements’ admission at trial, and why do centuries of
cases and commentaries discuss the contours of the exception? The
answer, of course, is that while the criminality of certain ventures
inspires a strong desire to see statements made in furtherance of those
ventures admitted despite the hearsay rule, even the most powerful
desire cannot transform a statement like “I got these drugs from Marlo
Stanfield, and he’ll kill anyone who tries to steal them” into a verbal act.
Likewise, under the third justification, the strong desire to see
coconspirator hearsay statements used at trial exists in tension with the
desire of evidence mavens to believe that evidence law separates the
admissible wheat from the excluded chaff. Proponents of the traditional
coconspirator hearsay exception, therefore, have occasionally opined
that statements in furtherance of conspiracies bear hallmarks of
reliability similar to other forms of admissible hearsay, such as
statements made to obtain medical treatment.90 The reality, however, is
that coconspirator hearsay statements are admissible despite their
unreliability, not because of any special probative value. Coconspirator
hearsay must be viewed with at least some suspicion because, by
definition, it is uttered by criminals. As Joseph Levie observed, “It is no
victory for common sense to make a belief that criminals are notorious
for their veracity the basis for law.”91 In addition, the secretive nature of
conspiracies can create situations in which the extrajudicial declarant
whose statement is admitted at trial had no personal knowledge of the
defendant or her activities.

89. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining “hearsay”).
90. See, e.g., 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1077
(Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974) (“[A]s a matter of probative value, the admissions of a person
having precisely the same interests at stake will in general be likely to be equally worthy of
consideration.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (medical diagnosis exception).
91. Joseph H. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators’
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1166 (1954).

2012]

CONFRONTING COVENTURERS

1689

Why then is such evidence admitted? Because of necessity. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed, “It has
also been candidly proposed by commentators, and implicitly
acknowledged by the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of
Evidence, that the exception is largely a result of necessity, since it is
most often invoked in conspiracy cases in which the proof would
otherwise be very difficult and the evidence largely circumstantial.”92
Criminal conspirators are not idiots; at least many of them are not. They
realize that government agents desire to thwart their schemes, and they
plan accordingly.93 Yet defeating their aims ranks among the most
important government tasks—one of the few activities acknowledged
by nearly all political philosophies as a proper function of the state. In a
free society, captured conspirators must be convicted before the state
may incarcerate or otherwise incapacitate them, a requirement
complicated by the secretive nature of much crime. So evidence law
strikes a compromise. If a statement is made in furtherance of a
conspiracy, one conspirator’s words may be used as evidence against all
the others, despite the lack of inherent reliability. Such evidence is
needed to fight crime. Besides, the evidence is used only against
conspirators, a class of persons who suffer far worse insults at the hands
of the law.
2. Why Courts Should Not Expand the Exception to Include Lawful
Ventures
Because the coconspirator hearsay exception admits unreliable
evidence—the Advisory Committee Note states that no “guarantee of
trustworthiness” is required for the admission of such evidence—courts
should hesitate to expand the scope of the exception absent a
compelling reason. No such reason has been offered. Indeed, the
primary justifications for the traditional coconspirator exception, (1) the
need to uncover and prosecute serious offenses committed by shadowy
groups in secret and (2) the idea that a coconspirator has brought his
evidentiary problems upon himself by joining the conspiracy and
accordingly deserves little sympathy when hanged by the words of his
confederate, withstand no scrutiny when applied to lawful joint
ventures. After all, the state is not traditionally in the business of
destroying lawful projects undertaken by cooperative citizens, and
92. United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979).
93. For example, consider the initial meeting of Baltimore’s “New Day Co-Op.” Upon the
conclusion of the meeting, chairman Stringer Bell angrily destroyed meeting minutes, chastising
their author for taking notes of a criminal conspiracy in accordance with Robert’s Rules of
Order. The Wire: Straight and True (HBO television broadcast Oct. 17, 2004). See also
generally, e.g., LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE 10140 (2008).
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participation in such efforts is not the sort of activity that causes
someone to “deserve” the admission of unreliable evidence against him
at trial.
A recent federal civil trial in Washington, D.C., displayed the perils
of the revisionist interpretation of the exception. In an unrelated prior
case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the traditional rule “that Rule
801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires, before
admission of co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements, a showing of an
unlawful conspiracy, not merely action in concert toward a common
goal.”94 The trial concerned whether Company A and Company B—
hired jointly to perform American-funded construction projects in
Egypt—had engaged in a broad “bid-rigging” conspiracy.95 Plaintiff, a
former employee of Company A (who stood to win money if the court
found fraud), sought to prove that executives at both companies knew of
the bid-rigging scheme.96 Specifically, Plaintiff testified about his own
conversation with Supervisor, his immediate boss. When Plaintiff
informed Supervisor about the scheme, Supervisor replied to the effect
of, “I’ll tell the CEO.” The statement was offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, that is, to prove that Supervisor indeed informed
Company A’s CEO, meaning the CEO knew of the bid rigging. If it
could be proven that Company A’s CEO knew about the scheme, it
followed that Company B’s executives must have known, too. After all,
the two companies submitted a joint bid for the project, and—as with
tango—it takes two to rig bids.
Company B objected to the evidence as hearsay. Although the
evidence might well have been admissible against Company A—
because Supervisor was employed by Company A when he said, “I’ll
tell the CEO”97—Company B is not responsible for Supervisor’s
statements under the principal–agent exception to the hearsay rule.
(Similarly, Company B would not generally be liable in tort for the
actions of Company A employees under the respondeat superior
doctrine.) Plaintiff responded that Supervisor’s statement was
admissible under the coconspirator statement exception because it was
94. See United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
95. See Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F. Supp. 2d 54, 73–75 (D.D.C. 2008). Because the
names of the companies and their employees—including two corporations and one natural
person, all named “Jones”—can cause confusion for readers, the discussion that follows uses
pseudonyms. Other details not relevant to the evidence issue have also been changed to improve
clarity.
96. Technically, Miller was a qui tam “relator” alleging fraud against the United States,
not a plaintiff alleging his own injuries. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining qui tam action as “[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private person to
sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will
receive”). The difference is not material to the evidence question presented.
97. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
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made in furtherance of the sewer-fixing joint venture between Company
A and Company B. In other words, Plaintiff argued that any statement
uttered by anyone working on the sewer project could be offered in
evidence against any other such person, regardless of who employed the
declarant or what the declarant’s role was in the venture.98
Neither Plaintiff nor Supervisor was in on the fraud; their only joint
venture was the construction contract. And neither Plaintiff nor
Supervisor worked for Company B, the party against whom the
evidence was offered. The trial judge, finding that Supervisor’s
statement was in furtherance of “the joint venture [which] would
[benefit] from uncovering any illegality among its activities,” admitted
the statements against Company B pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E).99 As a
result, the jury heard out-of-court statements normally barred by the
hearsay rule despite the lack of any special guarantees of
trustworthiness. The justification was that the party the evidence was
admitted against had joined a conspiracy to fix sewers in Cairo. Were
the lawful joint venture theory truly based on agency law, the judge
would have been right to admit the statements against the joint venture
itself, that is, against the Company A–Company B entity that contracted
to fix the sewers. Such an entity could fairly be held responsible for
actions taken by employees working on the project, regardless of what
company paid salaries to which employees. Accordingly, the principal–
agent hearsay exception might sensibly apply to statements by such
persons, including Plaintiff and Supervisor. But just as two employees
of the same corporation are not normally considered agents of one
another under the substantive law of agency, one cannot credibly argue
that Plaintiff and Supervisor were agents of Company B.100
To return from civil cases to the criminal law, imagine a corporate
executive charged with misleading investors in violation of federal
securities law.101 On a quarterly earnings call, the defendant spoke to
98. As we have seen before, this theory does not accord with the definition of joint
venture as those words are commonly understood. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying
text. The joint venture to fix the Cairo sewers was an undertaking of Company A and Company
B. Plaintiff and Supervisor, who happened to work for one of the companies participating in the
venture, were not themselves members of the joint venture.
99. See Miller, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
100. Another example: Publisher hires Scholar to write an evidence treatise. Are Publisher
and Scholar now joint venturers responsible for one another’s statements? Surely Publisher is
not the “agent” of Scholar, and Scholar is not liable in tort for the acts or omissions of Publisher
“in furtherance” of the treatise publication project (for example, if Publisher orders paper and
then refuses to pay for it, the paper seller cannot sue Scholar). Their project is, however, at least
as formal as other “ventures” deemed to have triggered the new version of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
See infra notes 125–128 and accompanying text.
101. This example is based loosely on United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J.
2008).
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analysts about the state of his employer. The stock price remained high,
and the defendant enjoyed a sizeable bonus based on the price of the
stock on the day after the call. Some time later, however, bad news
about the company leaked, and the stock tumbled, costing investors
dearly.102 The indictment alleges that the defendant knowingly lied on
the call to preserve his bonus. The defendant states that he knew nothing
at the time about any impending problems; he was as surprised as
anyone by the bad news.
Further, he contends that the bad news may not even have arisen by
the time of the earnings call. To prove that the executive’s statements
were false when made, the prosecution offers e-mail messages
exchanged by the company’s low-level employees a few days before the
earnings call. The messages show that the bad news—which eventually
became widely known and caused the stock price to plunge—occurred
before the call.103 The messages would be offered as substantive
evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. If the defense objects to the
documents as hearsay, arguing that the prosecution should call the
authors of the messages as witnesses subject to cross-examination at
trial, the prosecution could respond that the messages are statements in
furtherance of a lawful joint venture: the project of earning money for
the company that employed the e-mail authors and the defendant
alike.104 Unlike in a traditional coconspirator hearsay case, the
declarants here are not alleged to have done anything illegal, much less
to have participated in an illegal scheme with the defendant. The
“conspiracy” here is the daily workings of a legitimate corporate
enterprise. And the action of the defendant that subjects him to out-ofcourt statements without the benefit of cross-examination—messages no
more or less reliable than the vast universe of statements barred by the
hearsay rule—is getting an honest job.105

102. For example, sales data reveals that the company’s new product is selling poorly, and
a major customer has decided to buy no further goods from the company.
103. For example, one salesperson might have written to another, “The customers hate our
new product; nothing is selling. Our biggest, most loyal customer said today it will take its
business elsewhere.”
104. See supra note 76 (arguing that out-of-court statements of corporate employee made
in furtherance of employer’s aims are properly admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) against
every fellow employee of the corporation).
105. Depending on the precise relationship among the defendant executive and the
declarant employees, the disputed statements might be admissible under the principal–agent
exception. See Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1498 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Young,
736 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“[W]hen such a statement is offered against
another corporate employee, instead of the corporation, proper admission under Rule
801(d)(2)(D) will necessarily depend on the nature of the relationship between the declarant and
the defendant.”), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 1 (1985). In such a case, however, no
revision to the coconspirator exception would be needed.
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3. How the Revisionists are Wrong about Congress and the Supreme
Court
Congress is generally free to enact bad policy, and if the authors of
the Federal Rules of Evidence had chosen to codify a joint venture
exception to the hearsay rule, they could have done so. Accordingly, if
the revisionists can show that the Rules truly require the admission of
coventurer hearsay, then the policy analysis above becomes just so
much academic carping. As it happens, however, the revisionists ask
courts to adopt an interpretation that not only makes terrible policy but
also flouts the plain meaning of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the intent of
those who wrote it and voted for it.
As enacted in 1975, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provided that a statement is
not hearsay if it “is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” This sentence should be enough to bury the revisionist
interpretation of the coconspirator hearsay exception. To conclude that
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) includes lawful joint ventures, one must believe that
the United States Congress, seeking to convey a concept such as “any
joint enterprise, whether legal or illegal” could find no word more apt
than “conspiracy.” Proponents of the coventurer hearsay theory ask
courts to hold that the word “conspiracy” does not connote illegality.106
For example, a recent Fifth Circuit opinion reviews that court’s
precedent on joint venture hearsay as follows:
[W]e held that a ship’s logbook was admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(E) as a co-conspirator statement in a drug
conspiracy prosecution because “it is not necessary that the
conspiracy upon which admissibility of the statement is
predicated be that charged. Moreover, the agreement need
not be criminal in nature.” . . . We concluded that the ship’s
crew were engaged in the voyage of the ship, which “was a
‘joint venture’ in and of itself apart from the illegality of its
purpose,” and the logbook was created in furtherance of the
voyage.107
In the Fifth Circuit, therefore, “conspiracy” includes a recreational boat
trip, and logbooks created in furtherance of such a venture contain
coconspirator statements.108 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit held that
106. But see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “conspiracy” as
“agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, coupled with an intent to
achieve the agreement’s objective, and (in most states) action or conduct that furthers the
agreement; a combination for an unlawful purpose”).
107. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 502 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n. 41 (5th Cir. 1979)).
108. The discussion regarding lawful joint ventures in Postal is pure dicta because the case
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“conspiracy”
includes
“a
lawful
joint
enterprise
to
acquire . . . property,” which includes a situation in which one so-called
“conspirator” was “acting as [another’s] real estate agent for his
attempted purchase of the property.”109 Respect for plain English
demands rejection of the revisionist argument.
Significantly, neither the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801 nor
the legislative history contained in congressional committee reports
provides any indication that those voting for the Federal Rules intended
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to cover statements made in furtherance of lawful
ends. Although Rule 801(d)(2)(D), which codifies the principal–agent
hearsay exception, was written to include “a statement by the party’s
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship” and was not
limited to statements “in furtherance” of the agency or employment
relationship, the Advisory Committee concluded that coconspirator
hearsay is not properly analogized to statements of agents. The
Advisory Committee Note states that “the agency theory of conspiracy
is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility [of
coconspirator hearsay] beyond that already established.” The Note then
cites cases and legal commentary, all of which concern statements in
furtherance of illegal activity.110
Legislative history is no better for the revisionists. Revisionists like
to quote the Senate Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence,111 which
states:
While the rule refers to a coconspirator, it is this
committee’s understanding that the rule is meant to carry
forward the universally accepted doctrine that a joint
venturer is considered as a coconspirator for the purposes
of this rule even though no conspiracy has been charged.112
The words “joint venturer” allow the initial misconception that no
criminal act is required to create a “conspiracy” under the exception.
Not so. What the Senate Report makes clear is that despite the inclusion
of the word “conspiracy” in the codified exception, the drafters did not
concerned illegal drug smuggling. The El-Mezain court, however, used the “precedent” to
support admitting true lawful joint venture hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See id. at 503.
109. See United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
110. See Trachtenberg, supra note 13, at 604–07 (reviewing cited cases and articles in
detail).
111. For citations to this report in support of a joint venture hearsay theory, see, for
example, United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 200–01 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v.
Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 502 (5th
Cir. 2011).
112. S. REP. NO. 93–1277, at 26–27 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7073.
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intend to limit the scope of the exception to charged conspiracies.
Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a conspiracy may be uncharged, but it must
still be a conspiracy. The two cases cited in the Senate Report make
clear that lawful conduct was not on the legislative agenda.113
Further, a Supreme Court case commonly cited by revisionists,
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,114 simply does not support the
application of the coconspirator exception to lawful ventures.115 True,
the Hitchman Coal opinion recites the fiction that the coconspirator
exception is justified by the law of agency,116 but the Court states on the
very same page that a proponent of coconspirator hearsay must establish
the “element of illegality” to win admission of the evidence. 117 The
dispute in Hitchman Coal was whether the out-of-court statements
themselves could support a finding of illegality, not over whether
illegality was a necessary part of coconspirator hearsay.118
B. Crawford Admits Against Defendants Evidence that Roberts
Excluded
Had the Supreme Court never issued Crawford and its progeny—
that is, were the Roberts regime still good law—the Sixth Amendment
might serve as a last best chance of preventing coventurer hearsay from
infecting American criminal trials. Because Roberts interpreted the
Confrontation Clause as prohibiting the admission of hearsay against
criminal defendants unless the hearsay either satisfied a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception, or otherwise exhibited the “indicia of reliability”
associated with such venerable exceptions, the revisionist interpretation

113. The cited cases are United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1968) (declarant
and defendant “were engaged in an illegal joint enterprise” to make false statements to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service), and United States v. Spencer, 415 F.2d 1301, 1304
(7th Cir. 1969) (declarant and defendant “were engaged in a common enterprise, with the
objective of dealing in and disposing of . . . heroin”).
114. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
115. For briefs citing Hitchman Coal in support of the joint venture theory, see Final Brief
of United States at 39–40, United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 053086), 2006 WL 1197222; Memorandum in Support of the Motion in Limine of the United
States at 2–3, United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J. 2008) (Crim. No. 06-406);
Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion in Limine at 12, United States v.
Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. S1-05-Cr. 888), 2007 WL 1833480.
116. See Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 250.
117. Id. at 249.
118. Id. at 248–49. Indeed, the dissent—which rejects the majority’s conclusion that certain
United Mine Workers activities were illegal—states that “declarations of alleged co-conspirators
were obviously inadmissible [because there was] no foundation for the conspiracy charge.” Id.
at 268–69 & n.3 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The dissent’s argument makes no sense if hearsay
statements in furtherance of lawful ventures are admissible evidence; the union activity was
undoubtedly a joint undertaking.
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of the coconspirator hearsay exception would not pass constitutional
muster under Roberts.
Under Crawford, however, coventurer hearsay almost certainly
presents no Confrontation Clause problems for prosecutors because the
overwhelming majority of coventurer hearsay is nontestimonial.119
Unless the Court finds some way to exclude dangerously unreliable
nontestimonial hearsay, perhaps pursuant to the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the spread of the coventurer
exception will not be checked by appeals to the Constitution.
1. Today’s Constitution Will Not Save Us
Although substantial doubt remains concerning the precise
boundaries of testimonial hearsay—and accordingly, the universe of
statements barred by the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause remains
unsettled—the post-Crawford treatment of coconspirator hearsay is
largely resolved. Testimonial hearsay comprises “formal statement[s] to
government officers,” such as affidavits, fruits of interrogations, and
other utterances that declarants reasonably expected would be used for
prosecutorial purposes.120 To satisfy the definition of coconspirator
hearsay provided in the Federal Rules, a statement must be made
“during and in furtherance of [a] conspiracy.”121 By definition,
therefore, it is almost impossible for coconspirator hearsay to qualify as
testimonial, for conspirators generally have no interest in aiding
prosecution.122 Indeed, the Crawford majority opinion disclaims having
any effect on the coconspirator exception.123
119. While the overwhelming majority of coventurer hearsay is nontestimonial, not all of it
is. If, for example, a corporate employee testified as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the sworn
statements would be testimonial, and they would also presumably be “in furtherance” of the
interests of a corporate employer, a joint venture involving everyone else employed by the
corporation. An ordinary fact witness employed by an organizational defendant (such as
someone who observed a slip-and-fall at work) might also be considered to speak in furtherance
of the organization if her testimony is favorable to her employer.
120. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
121. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
122. Almost impossible, but not quite. For example, conspirators A and B might scheme to
falsely accuse their enemy, C, of murder. If A lied to a grand jury to secure C’s indictment, A’s
statements might well be in furtherance of the frame-job conspiracy, and they would also be
testimonial. Similarly, if a criminal defendant suborns perjury from an alibi witness, the
witness’s false testimony would further a conspiracy to obstruct justice. Such examples
constitute a tiny fraction of statements in furtherance of conspiracies.
123. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, 59 n.9. Because Crawford did not involve
coconspirator hearsay, such musings by the Court are dicta. Nonetheless, the result of a
Confrontation Clause challenge to run-of-the-mill coconspirator hearsay seems foreordained by
the logic of Crawford. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In
general, statements of co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy are non-testimonial.”);
State v. Larson, 788 N.W.2d 25, 36–37 (Minn. 2010).
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A simple example illustrates why the usual hearsay is
nontestimonial: Imagine that a group of terrorists plans to detonate a
bomb at the Super Bowl. The ringleader, Brady, orders his confederate,
Favre, to purchase a specific kind of explosive—Brand X. But Favre is
lazy and delegates the purchase to another confederate, Elway.
Unfortunately for the terrorists, the FBI has tapped Favre’s phone, and
agents record Favre telling Elway, “Brady wants ten pounds of Brand X
explosive, pronto.” Favre’s statement could be used against Brady
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). It was made during and in furtherance of
a conspiracy involving the declarant (Favre) and the party against whom
the evidence is offered (Brady). And the statement is clearly
nontestimonial. The last thing Favre desired while speaking to Elway
was for law enforcement to use Favre’s words to prosecute anyone.
When one considers the sorts of things said in furtherance of
conspiracies,124 it becomes obvious that the overwhelming bulk of
coconspirator hearsay creates no Sixth Amendment problems for
prosecutors under Crawford.125
The analysis is similar when one considers statements made “during
and in furtherance of” lawful joint ventures. According to the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. El-Mezain,126 admissibility of
statements under the coconspirator hearsay exception “does not turn on
the criminal nature of the endeavor.” Instead, “a statement may be
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if it is made in furtherance of a
lawful joint undertaking.”127 The El-Mezain court offered the example
of “a ship’s logbook,” which it concluded was properly admissible
against members of “the ship’s crew,” all of whom “were engaged in
the voyage of the ship,” because “the logbook was created in
furtherance of the voyage.”128 The D.C. Circuit used similarly broad
language in United States v. Gewin when describing the sort of ventures
124. A few more examples of such statements can be found in popular films. See, e.g., THE
GODFATHER: PART II (Paramount Pictures 1974) (“Michael Corleone says ‘Hello!’”); STAR
WARS (Twentieth Century Fox 1977) (“Help me, Obi-Wan Kenobi. You’re my only hope.”);
PULP FICTION (Jersey Films et al. 1994) (“You ain’t got no problem, Jules. . . . [W]ait for the
Wolf who should be coming directly.”).
125. In addition, the Court stated unanimously in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406
(2007), that if a hearsay statement is nontestimonial, then the Sixth Amendment presents no
barrier to its admission after Crawford. See id. at 420 (stating that Crawford
“eliminat[ed] . . . Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-ofcourt nontestimonial statements”).
126. 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011). This case involved a drug conspiracy prosecution. See
supra notes 106–09 for further discussion of this case.
127. 664 F.3d at 502.
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n.41 (5th Cir. 1979)). As it
happens, the “voyage” at issue in Postal involved the smuggling of eight thousand pounds of
marijuana, meaning that any discussion of statements made in furtherance of lawful joint
ventures was dicta. See 589 F.2d at 867–68.
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that count as a “conspiracy” for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), stating
that “the rule . . . ‘embodies the long-standing doctrine that when two or
more individuals are acting in concert toward a common goal, the outof-court statements of one are . . . admissible against the others, if made
in furtherance of the common goal.’”129 These expansive definitions of
coventurer hearsay lead to two conclusions. First, a tremendous amount
of statements otherwise excluded by the hearsay rule are now
admissible evidence pursuant to the revisionist interpretation of the
coconspirator statement exception. Second, most (although not all) such
hearsay is nontestimonial.
The first conclusion follows from the observation that pretty much
everyone makes statements in furtherance of joint undertakings pretty
much every day, yet a person can go years without uttering anything
plausibly described as testimonial. A secretary says to his colleague,
“The boss likes this report and wants fifty color copies.” The statement
is in furtherance of the employees’ joint venture—that is, the work of
their common employer130—and has no reasonably predictable relation
to any prosecution. If the colleague were to testify, “My coworker said
our boss liked the report and wanted fifty copies,” the defense could
object on hearsay grounds. After all, the colleague is repeating the
secretary’s out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, that is, that the boss truly wanted the copies made and liked the
report. If, however, the boss is a criminal defendant, 131 prosecutors (at
least in some circuits) can now respond that the statement is admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). If the defense attorney graduated from law
school some years ago and has not followed the Supreme Court’s
reimagination of the Confrontation Clause, an objection might ensue on
Sixth Amendment grounds. The objection would be overruled because
the secretary’s statement, “The boss likes this report and wants fifty
129. United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). As it happens, the joint venture at issue in Weisz
“was to bribe a Congressman,” 718 F.2d at 434, meaning that any discussion of statements made
in furtherance of lawful joint ventures was dicta.
130. Readers skeptical that work for a common employer could really be deemed a
“conspiracy” under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) should see Gewin, 471 F.3d at 200 (affirming admission
of evidence under the coconspirator exception based on “a preponderance of the evidence
support[ing] a finding that the group had engaged in a common enterprise of stock promotion”
and rejecting argument that the Rule requires, “before admission of co-conspirators’ out-ofcourt statements, a showing of an unlawful conspiracy, not merely action in concert toward a
common goal”); readers should also see Memorandum in Support of the Motion in Limine of
the United States to Admit Statements at 1, United States v. Schiff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 818 (D.N.J.
Feb. 12, 2008) (Crim. No. 06-406) (seeking admission against criminal defendants of statements
made by other employees in furtherance of the business of their common pharmaceutical
company employer).
131. Perhaps the boss’s knowledge of the contents of the report is evidence of scienter in a
securities fraud case.
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color copies,” was not an utterance that the secretary reasonably
expected would be used for prosecutorial purposes.132
The joint venture need not even be as formal as a business to satisfy
the revisionist interpretation of the coconspirator exception.133 After all,
a ship’s voyage counts. If on Monday Abel says, “Hey, Cain, let’s go
fishing on Saturday; I have plenty of beer,” the statement demonstrates
that “two or more individuals are acting in concert toward a common
goal.”134 Let us imagine that the boat sinks during the trip and that Abel
drowns. Abel’s widow sues Cain, alleging he piloted the boat while
intoxicated, thereby negligently causing Abel’s death. If Cain asserts
that no booze was taken on the fishing trip, plaintiff’s counsel might
wish to use Abel’s statement (“I have plenty of beer”) as evidence that
Cain and Abel had alcohol on board. If someone who overheard Abel’s
side of the conversation is called as a witness, his testimony that Abel
claimed to possess copious beer would normally be inadmissible
hearsay—the repetition of an out-of-court statement to prove its truth.
Fortunately for Abel’s widow, however, Abel was speaking in
furtherance of the fishing trip when he mentioned the beer, and the trip
was a joint project of the declarant and Cain, the party against whom the
evidence is offered. The scope of the revisionist coventurer exception
therefore includes the statement. Further, no part of the fishing-tripplanning discussions was testimonial.
Certain readers will object, upon reading the prior paragraph, that
the Confrontation Clause is irrelevant to the Cain and Abel trial because
the clause applies only to evidence offered against criminal defendants.
The Supreme Court has often instructed that regardless of changing
interpretations of the hearsay rule, the Sixth Amendment has an
independent meaning, and it keeps out statements that would violate the
confrontation rights of criminal defendants regardless of how one reads
the rules of evidence.135 This distinction makes sense. Drafters of rules
of evidence cannot eliminate constitutional protections any more than
drafters of criminal procedure rules could authorize compulsory selfincrimination. While a state would be free to repeal the hearsay rule
entirely,136 the Sixth Amendment would continue to apply to criminal
trials in that state, causing testimonial hearsay to remain inadmissible.
Similarly, if a state adopted the revisionist interpretation of the
132. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
133. Indeed, federal prosecutors recently argued that a common goal of getting a favored
candidate elected to office qualifies as a “conspiracy” under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and one need
not even be employed by the campaign to qualify as a member of the conspiracy. See infra note
242 and accompanying text.
134. See Gewin, 471 F.3d at 201.
135. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
136. For a recent proposal to that effect, see Matthew Caton, Abolish the Hearsay Rule:
The Truth of the Matter Asserted at Last, 26 ME. B.J. 126 (2011).
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coconspirator hearsay exception, the Sixth Amendment, depending on
how it is interpreted, might preclude the use of coventurer hearsay at
criminal trials.137
2. Yesterday’s Constitution Might Well Have Saved Us
To see how the Sixth Amendment might affect coventurer hearsay,
let us imagine that Cain, in addition to facing a lawsuit, has been
charged with negligent homicide and the reckless piloting of a ship.138
We have seen that under Crawford, Abel’s “I have plenty of beer”
declaration is equally admissible against Cain at civil and criminal
trials. Under Roberts, however, Cain’s civil and criminal trials would
have proceeded differently. Because the Confrontation Clause had no
more bearing on civil trials under Roberts than it does under Crawford,
the civil trial would be unchanged under a Roberts Sixth Amendment
regime. In other words, in a state or federal court adopting the
revisionist interpretation of the coconspirator hearsay exception, the “I
have plenty of beer” evidence is admissible against Cain at a civil trial
as a coventurer hearsay.
The distinction is seen at the criminal trial, where Cain stands
charged with negligent homicide or some other offense. Under Roberts,
the admissibility of hearsay did not depend on whether the Supreme
Court deemed an out-of-court declaration to be “testimonial.” It
depended instead on whether the statement was considered reliable,
with the reliability analysis relying in part on centuries of judicial
consideration of which hearsay is properly admissible at trial. As the
Roberts Court explained, the hearsay declaration of someone
unavailable to testify “is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of
reliability.’”139 The Court explained further that such reliability may be
presumed for statements falling “within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception,” such as an excited utterance or a business record. 140 In
addition, hearsay not within a venerable exception might pass Sixth
Amendment muster if it exhibited “a showing of particular guarantees
of trustworthiness.”141
137. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
138. For a real-world criminal case involving coventurer hearsay, consider the prosecution
of Senator John Edwards for campaign finance law violations. See infra note 238 and
accompanying text.
139. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
140. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2), 803(6); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Before the question was
settled in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987), there was a circuit split
concerning whether the coconspirator statement exception was “firmly rooted.” See Sanson v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1264, 1265 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); see also People v. Sanders,
436 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 1982) (interpreting Ohio v. Roberts and holding that not all coconspirator
hearsay was admissible under state confrontation clause).
141. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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In Idaho v. Wright, the Court explained that the “guarantees of
trustworthiness” demanded in Roberts could not consist of external
evidence that the hearsay declarant spoke truthfully. 142 The Court made
clear that the proponent of hearsay evidence could not satisfy the Sixth
Amendment simply by providing extrinsic evidence bolstering the
veracity of the out-of-court speaker. Rather, the admissibility depended
“only [on] those [circumstances] that surround[ed] the making of the
statement and that render[ed] the declarant particularly worthy of
belief.”143 The facts of Wright help illustrate the distinction. In Wright,
the prosecution introduced evidence of hearsay statements uttered by a
two-and-a-half-year-old girl to a doctor during a criminal investigation.
The Court held that independent evidence that the girl spoke truthfully
when describing sexual abuse (observations by her doctor of the girl’s
physical condition) would not serve to justify admitting her hearsay;
instead, a criminal trial court could admit evidence of her statements
only upon a finding that declarants in her situation have the same
overall trustworthiness as declarants whose statements fall within
traditional hearsay exceptions.144
In the Cain criminal trial, the prosecution would likely desire to
offer the “I have plenty of beer” statement made by Abel shortly before
his death. The evidence would tend to prove that Cain and Abel took
beer along on their fatal fishing trip. Although the evidence would not
prove conclusively that the pair brought booze with them, much less
that Cain imbibed, it would easily satisfy the relevance standard of
Federal Rule of Evidence 401. And although the statement is hearsay—
an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, that is, that Abel possessed plenty of beer immediately before
the fishing trip and probably intended to bring the beer on the trip—a
court applying the revisionist interpretation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) or a
state equivalent could admit the evidence as a statement made in
furtherance of the joint fishing excursion. But not without considering
the Confrontation Clause. While the coconspirator exception has been
part of the federal common law of evidence for hundreds of years, and
has been codified in the Federal Rules since 1975, courts have admitted
coventurer hearsay pursuant to that exception only for a few years.145
Accordingly, Abel’s statement is not within a “firmly rooted” hearsay
exception.146
142. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
143. Id. at 819, 822.
144. Id. at 822–23; see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137–38 (1999) (rejecting
hearsay on Sixth Amendment grounds upon finding that the circumstances of its utterance lack
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”).
145. See generally Trachtenberg, supra note 13.
146. One can hardly doubt that the revisionist exception is not firmly rooted. After all, the
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Nor does Abel’s statement bear special indicia of trustworthiness
that might satisfy the Roberts reliability requirement despite the absence
of a firmly rooted hearsay exception. A person who tells a fishing buddy
“I have plenty of beer” may be telling the truth, and he may be
inaccurate. Perhaps he misremembers the state of his beer supplies; the
extent of last night’s drinking session can be a hazy matter. Perhaps he
knows he lacks beer and fully intends to buy some before the trip,
making his statement a harmless “little white lie” necessary to entice his
friend to join a mutually agreeable excursion. Perhaps he correctly
believes that he left the house with a fridge full of beer that morning,
but his unemployed brother-in-law has consumed it all while he was at
work. Perhaps his house has been destroyed by fire, with no beer spared
from the insatiable flames. Perhaps his wife, tired of his destructive
drinking habit, has poured the beer down the drain. Who can know? The
declarant is not available for cross-examination, and his statement is no
more reliable than the common out-of-court dross excluded by the
hearsay rule since the seventeenth century. Under Ohio v. Roberts and
Idaho v. Wright, Cain might well have suffered the admission of Abel’s
unreliable statement at his civil trial. But he could have relied upon the
Sixth Amendment to protect him from being sent to prison on the basis
of the idle chatter of an out-of-court declarant not subject to crossexamination.
The trials of Cain demonstrate that with coventurer hearsay, we
have proof that the Crawford regime is failing in the important task of
providing a constitutional backstop to rules of evidence (or, to put it
another way, failing to set an appropriate minimum level of
confrontation rights). Hardly any boundary circumscribes the vast
territory of coventurer hearsay. A person who says to coworkers,
“Smith will be late to work today; his car broke down” is presumably
speaking in furtherance of his employer’s interests, broadly defined.
Under the revisionist exception, the statement is admissible against
Smith at a criminal trial,147 as well as against any other employee of the
same employer.148 No evidence of reliability is necessary under Rule
801(d)(2). The statement is also almost surely not testimonial. But is it
the kind of statement sensibly admitted against a criminal defendant
traditional coconspirator hearsay exception was the subject of a circuit split concerning the
firmness of its roots. See supra note 136. Had Crawford not mooted the question, revisionists
might well have argued that the coventurer exception is as firmly rooted as the coconspirator
exception; indeed, they argue that the exceptions are one and the same. I respectfully disagree
with such historical claims.
147. Such evidence might undermine Smith’s alibi, were he charged with a crime
committed near his home around 9 a.m. that he claims he could not have perpetrated because he
was at work.
148. Perhaps a different employee has been charged, and she claims that Smith saw her
arrive at work on time. Evidence that Smith was late would rebut her defense.
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who ostensibly has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses
against him”?149 For all we know, Smith convinced a friend to drive him
to work, or his car was fixed the previous day unbeknown to his
colleague. The declarant might well have eventually learned whether his
statement was correct; he may have seen Smith arrive late, or arrive on
time, or heard later from someone else about the timing of Smith’s
arrival. Absent the chance to cross-examine the declarant, a party
against whom the hearsay is presented must somehow repair the
damage caused by unreliable evidence admitted pursuant to a
newfangled hearsay exception. Roberts limited the effect of such
amendments to the law of evidence, but Crawford stands aside as
evidence law denies criminal defendants the opportunity to question the
declarants of statements used to incriminate them.
3. Will Tomorrow’s Constitution Save Us?
Although Crawford is written with a tone that suggests that the
Confrontation Clause problem has been solved once and for all, some
doubt remains about whether the “testimonial or not” test will remain
the touchstone of confrontation law without further tweaking. In recent
years, commentators have wondered whether other constitutional
provisions might stand in for the absent Confrontation Clause to
preclude the admission of certain unreliable or unfairly prejudicial
hearsay.150 For example, admission of evidence that is sufficiently
unreliable—lacking probative value—and concurrently is quite unfairly
prejudicial might violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.151 True, such evidence “may be excluded”
pursuant to ordinary evidence law,152 and the failure to exclude such
evidence occasionally causes appellate courts to vacate convictions
upon finding that trial judges abused their discretion.153 It is well settled,
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004)
(noting that the Confrontation Clause is supposed to limit judicial discretion with respect to the
admission of out-of-court statements against criminal defendants).
150. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Avoiding a Confrontation?: How Courts Have Erred in
Finding that Nontestimonial Hearsay is Beyond the Scope of the Bruton Doctrine, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 625, 673 n.357 (2012) (“Some have argued that courts should find that the admission of
co-defendant confessions at joint jury trials can violate the Due Process Clause based upon the
likelihood that jurors would ignore limiting instructions.”).
151. See James B. Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the
Confrontation Rationale, and a Proposal for a Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions,
18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1980).
152. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 509 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(considering “the recurring questions of when evidence of a defendant’s possession of a weapon
at the time of arrest may properly be admitted under Rule 403”); id. at 518 (Oakes, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. James, 169 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1999).
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however, that the Constitution provides for a minimum of fair
procedures at criminal trials, irrespective of changes to, and
interpretations of, the rules of evidence.
Professor Akhil Amar, writing in the context of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, argues persuasively that when the correct reading of a
constitutional provision denies someone fundamental fairness, the better
solution is to find a right to the desired fairness in the Due Process
Clause, not to create nonsensical interpretations of other clauses to
reach a desired result.154 Accordingly, even if one assumes that every jot
of Crawford’s historical analysis is correct and that Justice Scalia has
divined the intentions of the Framers of the Confrontation Clause in all
material respects, one need not conclude that any nontestimonial
statement may freely be admitted against criminal defendants without
causing constitutional injury. Professor Amar writes that “to say that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not reach civil cases about money is not
to leave defendants in these cases defenseless against state assault.
Rather, it is to give them the shield of the Due Process Clause.”155
Similarly, if the Confrontation Clause does not apply to coventurer
hearsay uttered in a nontestimonial manner, criminal defendants need
not be helpless against the revisionist coconspirator hearsay exception;
they too should seek shelter in due process.156
How might such a due process analysis unfold? The answer, as
unpalatable as it may be to Crawford proponents, would probably have
much in common with Roberts. Out-of-court statements offered against
criminal defendants under Roberts were evaluated according to criteria
related to fundamental fairness. If a declarant could not be crossexamined, a trial court would consider the reliability of the evidence
offered. Statements offered pursuant to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions
were presumed generally reliable because the longstanding existence of
a hearsay exception demonstrated a judicial consensus on the expected
reliability of a class of statements. In the Advisory Committee Note to
Federal Rule of Evidence 803, for example, one finds explanations for
the several hearsay exceptions codified in that rule. The “excited
utterance” exception is codified because “circumstances may produce a
154. See Akil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J 1807, 1809
(1997) (“[T]he clean and simple rules of the Double Jeopardy Clause must be supplemented by
several broader but more flexible commonsense principles protected by the Due Process
Clause.”).
155. Id. at 1812.
156. For additional examples of when the Due Process Clause might be invoked to solve
the problem of a constitutional clause that appears too narrow to address a specific injustice, see
Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,
18–20 (1998) (“The [Due Process] clause is a grand and general guarantee of fair procedures,
and it makes no sense to undo it because other clauses also aim at fair procedures, clarifying and
specifying what general fairness might mean in a given context.”).
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condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of
reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”157
Although the Note acknowledges criticism of the exception “on the
ground that excitement impairs accuracy of observation as well as
eliminating conscious fabrication,” it was ultimately included because
“it finds support in cases without number.” Applying the rule of Roberts
to this exception, the Supreme Court held that excited utterances (also
known as “spontaneous declarations”) by out-of-court declarants not
available for cross-examination were properly admitted despite the
Confrontation Clause.158
If the Supreme Court remains convinced that excited utterances are
largely reliable and that subsequent cross-examination of a previously
excited declarant would add little truth-seeking value, then a due
process challenge to the admission of excited utterances should fail. If,
however, the Court were somehow convinced that excited utterances are
not so accurate after all—accepting the critiques mentioned in passing
by the Advisory Committee—then perhaps the use of such hearsay
against criminal defendants denies them due process of law.159 A
defendant raising a due process challenge would presumably argue that
excited utterances lack “indicia of reliability,” even if the defendant did
not use the shibboleth seemingly discredited by Crawford, for the use of
unreliable and highly prejudicial evidence appears offensive to the
standards of fair play and substantial justice. The same exercise can
proceed for coventurer hearsay. Even if one concedes that the
Confrontation Clause question is settled by Crawford, hearsay
sufficiently lacking in probative value and causing sufficient unfair
prejudice to defendants may one day be found to violate the Due
Process Clauses.160 The absence of case law construing the application
of the Due Process Clauses to unreliable hearsay is easily explained:
The exclusion of such hearsay was until recently the job of the

157. FED. R. EVID. 803 (advisory committee note).
158. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–57 (1992).
159. The Court invited such challenges in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 163 n.15
(1970) (predicting that the Court “may agree that considerations of due process, wholly apart
from the Confrontation Clause, might prevent convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is
totally lacking”).
160. The Court has repeatedly noted the interrelatedness of the Due Process Clause and the
Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (stating that both
clauses protect access to courts); see also Lindsey v. United States, 484 U.S. 934, 934 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The issue here is whether a defendant’s rights
under the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses are violated when the Government forces a
witness to take the stand solely to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in front of the
jury even though the Government already knew that the witness would refuse to testify.”);
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 72 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Confrontation Clause.161 The new vision of that clause set forth by the
Supreme Court in Crawford and subsequent cases has laid the
groundwork for new due process arguments.162 A more muscular
application of due process to hearsay would not render the
Confrontation Clause irrelevant. Certain testimonial hearsay might well
violate Crawford if admitted without the opportunity for crossexamination of the declarant without being sufficiently unreliable to
offend due process rules. Regardless, some redundancy among the Due
Process Clauses and other rights-protecting constitutional provisions is
inevitable and no cause for alarm.163
In addition to the Due Process Clauses, objections to unreliable
nontestimonial hearsay may yet find some support in the Confrontation
Clause, even after Crawford. A few post-Crawford opinions have hinted
that—at least for some Justices—reliability remains relevant to
Confrontation Clause analysis. For example, in Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent for four Justices.164
The issue presented in that case was whether the Confrontation Clause
allows the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report
including a certification via the testimony of a scientist who was not the
scientist who signed the certification or observed or performed the test
described in the certification. The majority held that a defendant has the
right to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification—not
a surrogate analyst.165 The dissenters argued that admitting the report
through another analyst is “fully consistent with the Confrontation
Clause and with well-established principles for ensuring that criminal
trials are conducted in full accord with requirements of fairness and
reliability and with the confrontation guarantee.”166 Replacement of a
161. Even in the days of Roberts, courts did note the importance of due process analysis to
Confrontation Clause concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 502–03 & n.4
(3d Cir. 1979) (stating that “the intrinsic interests of due process and fairness . . . [are among
the] significant underpinnings of the right of confrontation”).
162. Cf. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). The Court noted that while
criminal trial courts have broad latitude concerning what evidence to exclude, “[t]his latitude . . .
has limits. ‘Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or
in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”’” Id.
at 324 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
163. For example, demanding excessive bail might violate a defendant’s due process rights,
as might a denial of the rights protected by the Compulsory Process Clause and the Assistance
of Counsel Clause.
164. See 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissenters objected to
the majority’s decision, which they believed “held that the Confrontation Clause bars admission
of scientific findings when an employee of the testing laboratory authenticates the findings,
testifies to the laboratory’s methods and practices, and is cross-examined at trial.” Id.
165. Id. at 2710.
166. Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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single Justice could create a majority that once again believes that
“reliability is a legitimate concern” in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.167 Also, the concurring opinion of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor—whose vote was necessary to obtain a majority but who
was not willing to join the opinion of the Court—left some ambiguity as
to what precise holding could attract five votes.168
Further ambiguity was sown by the opinions in Michigan v.
Bryant,169 in which the Court deemed statements made by a gunshot
victim to police to be nontestimonial, holding that the victim’s
responses to police questioning could be admitted without violating the
defendant shooter’s Confrontation Clause rights. Writing for the
majority, Justice Sotomayor wrote that “standard rules of hearsay,
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant” in
deciding what statements are nontestimonial and accordingly are not
covered by the Confrontation Clause.170 Justice Scalia mourned in his
dissent that the majority “distorts [the Court’s] Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.”171
Most recently, a fractured Court in Williams v. Illinois demonstrated
that the Justices have reached no consensus about the Sixth
Amendment.172 The case concerned yet another lab report, this one
concerning DNA analysis.173 The primary difference was that in
Williams, at least in theory, the hearsay report at issue was not offered
directly into evidence for its truth. Instead, a testifying DNA expert
claimed to rely on the report of a different, absent technician in forming
her own expert opinion.174 The Court upheld the conviction but did not
present a justification for the result accepted by a majority of Justices. A
plurality opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, written for himself and three
other Justices, stated that the absent author’s report was not admitted for
its truth and that the statements in the report were not testimonial.175
167. Id. at 2725.
168. See Colin Miller, Independence Day?: What Does Justice Sotomayor’s Bullcoming
Concurrence Tell Us About Expert Opinions Based Upon Non-Admitted Testimonial Reports?,
EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (June 28, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/06/
while-i-was-away-guest-blogger-ann-murphywrote-an-excellent-post-about-the-supreme-courtsrecent-opinion-in-bullcoming-v-ne.html.
169. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
170. Id. at 1155.
171. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Because I continue to adhere to the Confrontation
Clause that the People adopted, as described in Crawford . . . I dissent.”).
172. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). For a thoughtful analysis of Williams,
along with the prior lab report cases of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, see George Fisher,
Williams v. Illinois: Case Note, (June 25, 2012) (on file with author).
173. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227–28.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 2236–38, 2242–44. Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Stephen Breyer and Anthony Kennedy. Id. at 2227.
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Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the result only, agreeing that the
statements were nontestimonial but declining to join any of the plurality
opinion.176 In a dissent written for herself and three other Justices,
Justice Elena Kagan noted that a majority of the Court (the four
dissenters and Justice Thomas) rejected the reasoning of the plurality
opinion.177
The dissenters argued that the facts of Williams did not differ
materially from those of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and that
reaching the same result—exclusion of the challenged hearsay—should
be easy.178 Reiterating the importance of cross-examination, the
dissenters seemed concerned with the unreliability of testimony
repeating the conclusions of an absent DNA technician. Indeed, the
dissent opened with an anecdote of a DNA expert (from the same lab at
issue in Williams, in another case concerning DNA samples from a rape
victim and an accused rapist) recanting testimony on the stand after
undergoing an effective cross-examination.179 The anecdote shows that
a scientific test “is only as reliable as the people who perform it,” the
dissent opined.180 Does this opinion imply that four Justices are ready to
return to a reliability analysis seemingly rejected in Crawford? Probably
not.181 And putting together a majority seems even less likely. Then
again, a majority of Justices have joined opinions, all written after
Crawford, that suggest the importance of reliability (or, the dangers of
unreliability) to proper Confrontation Clause analysis.182 In any event,
the uncertainty inspired by Bullcoming, Bryant, and Williams at least
leaves open the possibility that sufficiently unreliable hearsay may face
successful Confrontation Clause challenges even if not squarely within
the definition of testimonial set forth in Crawford.
176. See id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). As Justice Kagan noted in
dissent, the definition of testimonial used by Justice Thomas in Williams has been accepted by
no other Justice. See id. at 2273, 2275–76 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 2268. Kagan was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia,
and Sonia Sotomayor. Id. at 2264.
178. See id. at 2265 (“Under our Confrontation Clause precedents, this is an open-and-shut
case.”).
179. See id. at 2264 (“But after undergoing cross-examination, the analyst realized she had
made a mortifying error. She took the stand again, but this time to admit that the report listed the
victim’s control sample as coming from [the defendant] Kocak, and Kocak’s as coming from the
victim.”).
180. Id. at 2275.
181. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (unanimous opinion stating that
nontestimonial hearsay is completely unregulated by the Sixth Amendment under Crawford,
regardless of reliability).
182. See Fisher, supra note 172, at 13–17 (“[T]he urge to root the rationale and reach of the
Confrontation Clause to the apparent unreliability of contested hearsay evidence has gripped at
least five members of the Court . . . . [T]he broader question is whether the revival of reliability
reasoning someday might claim a stable Court majority.”).
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III. ANSWERING THE “SO WHAT?” REJOINDER
Why then should a reader care about all this doctrinal dispute? Even
if this Article correctly identifies a shortcoming in recent Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, surely the possibility of imperfect
constitutional law is not news.183 If Justices Scalia, Sotomayor, Thomas,
and the rest of the Court cannot agree on a definition of testimonial,
perhaps even diligent observers of criminal procedure can be excused if
they turn their attention elsewhere. The answer is that for all their
historiographical mediocrity, Justice Scalia’s recent Confrontation
Clause opinions correctly assert the importance of cross-examination to
the American criminal justice system, as well as the danger that hearsay
admitted by well-meaning courts can present to fundamental fairness
and substantial justice. In other words, Crawford’s primary value is in
barring certain evidence; it would be ironic and inappropriate to allow
Crawford to be the basis for admitting evidence such as coventurer
hearsay.184 This Part begins with a return to the historical record,
explaining that coventurer hearsay is much like certain hearsay offered
against Sir Walter Raleigh at his infamous trial. Returning to this
century, the remainder of this Part examines the admission of joint
venturer statements against criminal defendants, arguing that such
evidence has no place in American criminal courts.
A. Historical Evidence Argues Against Admission of Coventurer
Hearsay
If the Supreme Court continues to invoke the name of Sir Walter
Raleigh to defend Crawford and its progeny, the Court may well wear it
out.185 Yet the very hearsay written out of the Confrontation Clause by
Crawford—that is, casual nontestimonial chatter by unreliable, absent
declarants—was instrumental in the conviction and execution of
Raleigh at the trial decried by Justice Scalia.186 Accordingly, if one
183. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356
(1981).
184. I do not mean to argue that a new constitutional evidence or criminal procedure rule
can never properly allow the admission of evidence previously excluded by Supreme Court
precedent. In this specific case, however, the newly admitted evidence is precisely the sort that
ought to be excluded by the historical arguments and moral appeals justifying the new rule.
185. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1173 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Royal officials conducted many of the ex parte examinations introduced against Sir Walter
Raleigh and Sir John Fenwick while investigating alleged treasonous conspiracies of unknown
scope, aimed at killing or overthrowing the King.”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.
Ct. 2527, 2535 (2009) (“[T]he purported distinctions respondent and the dissent identify
between this case and Sir Walter Raleigh’s ‘conventional’ accusers do not survive scrutiny.”);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–44, 50–51, 62, 68 (2004) (mentioning Raleigh
nineteen times in majority opinion).
186. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (“One of Raleigh’s trial judges later lamented that ‘the
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believes that the authors and ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment intended
to prohibit the sorts of injustices visited upon Raleigh, then a review of
the historical record reveals that Crawford allows too much hearsay into
criminal trials.
In particular, a complete appraisal of the Raleigh trial must confront
the statement of Dyer, a ship’s pilot who testified about a trip he took to
Portugal.
[The prosecution] then produced one Dyer, a pilot, who
being sworn, said, Being at Lisbon, there came to me a
Portugal gentleman who asked me how the King of
England did, and whether he was crowned? I answered him
that I hoped our noble King was well and crowned by this,
but the time was not come when I came from the coast for
Spain. “Nay,” says he, “your King shall never be crowned,
for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh will cut his throat before
he come to be crowned.” And this in time was found to be
spoken in mid July.187
Raleigh objected to the evidence, not by contesting its admissibility but
rather by attacking its weight. “This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or
beggarly Priest; but what proof is it against me?” The prosecutor
replied, “It must per force arise out of some preceding intelligence, and
shows that your treason had wings.”188 Raleigh, of course, had no
opportunity to cross-examine the “Portugal gentleman” whose
purported statement Dyer repeated at Raleigh’s trial. Observers writing
long before the birth of Michael Crawford understood the importance of
Dyer’s testimony. An English historian wrote, after recounting Dyer’s
testimony in a 1920 book, “A trial thus conducted left the prisoner no
hope.”189 Justice William O. Douglas wrote in a 1953 article:
A virus had infected the trial and put it beyond salvation.
The one witness called, a man by the name of Dyer,
testified to the rankest form of hearsay . . . . This was some
of the stuff behind the clamor for a Bill of Rights at the
time of the adoption of our Constitution.190

justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter
Raleigh.’”).
187. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1 CRIMINAL TRIALS 400, 436 (David Jardine ed., 1832).
188. Id.
189. See FRANCIS CHARLES MONTAGUE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE ACCESSION
OF JAMES I TO THE RESTORATION 9 (1920); see also WILLIAM STEBBING, SIR WALTER RALEIGH:
A BIOGRAPHY 216 (Clarendon Press, 1891) (calling Dyer’s testimony “worse than irrelevant”).
190. William O. Douglas, A Crusade for the Bar: Due Process in a Time of World Conflict,
39 A.B.A. J. 871, 872 (1953). Justice Douglas then compared Raleigh’s trial to the Salem Witch
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Ironically, at least one court expressed its concern that the Roberts
regime might allow testimony such as Dyer’s into American trials, a
result nearly guaranteed by Crawford. “One would think that the
possibility that the fisherman’s testimony would be admissible today
had been safely put to rest. Yet, if a federal judge believed that the
Portuguese gentleman’s statement was made under conditions
suggesting its trustworthiness, Sir Walter might fare no better today
than he did under Elizabeth.”191 Roberts and its progeny left some doubt
about what particular hearsay might be admissible. After all, judicial
opinions cannot define with precision which statements possess “indicia
of reliability,” particularly with respect to statements not yet uttered.
Nonetheless, it was once believed by criminal procedure scholars that
“[w]hatever the origins of the confrontation clause, it exists to prevent
abuses in criminal trials like those suffered by Sir Walter Raleigh.”192
Today, Dyer’s hearsay testimony offered at Raleigh’s trial is
nontestimonial and outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
Coventurer statements—despite being nontestimonial—are just the
kind of confrontation-free testimony that the Sixth Amendment ought to
prevent. Coventurer hearsay is no more inherently reliable than idle
chatter among gentlemen and sailors. It does not have the indicia of
reliability that justified the admission of certain hearsay under Roberts.
Unlike in the rare scenarios in which post-Crawford decisions have said
testimonial hearsay might be used, such as forfeiture,193 participants in
lawful ventures have done nothing to justify the elimination of their
constitutional right to confront witnesses. In addition, unlike true
coconspirator hearsay, a species of nontestimonial hearsay permitted
under the Roberts regime, participants in lawful ventures have done
nothing to justify eliminating their constitutional right to confront
witnesses.

Trials. Id. at 872–73; see also 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 333–36 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (discussing common law confrontation
right developed in response to injustices at Raleigh’s trial).
191. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 406 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Paul Bergman,
Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody Talks About, 75 KY. L.J. 841, 883
(1987)).
192. Frederic L. Borch III, The Use of Co-conspirator Statements Under the Rules of
Evidence: A Revolutionary Change in Admissibility, 124 MIL. L. REV. 163, 177 (1989); see also
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 (1970) (“At least one author traces the
Confrontation Clause to the common-law reaction against these abuses of the Raleigh trial.”)
(citing FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 104 (1969)); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 n.16 (1970).
193. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682–83 (2008). The Court held that even the
murder of a potential witness does not allow testimonial hearsay to be used against the killer in a
criminal case, unless the defendant killed the witness with the purpose of preventing him from
testifying. Id. at 2687–91.
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To understand the historical background of the Confrontation
Clause, it is not enough to review infamous English injustices like the
Raleigh trial. One must also consider the context of colonial America in
which the Sixth Amendment was written. As Professor Randolph
Jonakait has written, the Sixth Amendment did not merely adopt
English common law protections in force at the time of ratification. The
Assistance of Counsel Clause, for example, provides far greater access
to trial counsel than was permitted in England in 1791.194 Recognizing
that in the late eighteenth century American states relied substantially
more on cross-examination to protect the rights of accused than did
contemporary English trials (in England, the trial judge was presumed
to look after the interests of defendants), Professor Jonakait argues
persuasively that the Sixth Amendment “constitutionalized the criminal
procedure that Americans had developed and . . . constitutionalized a
procedure where the accused could truly test and challenge the
government’s case.”195 Or, in the words of Professor Kenneth Graham,
“the right of confrontation is an American innovation, not an import
from England,” and the “Founders wanted a right to confront not only
the ‘witnesses’ who appeared at trial but the ‘accusers’ who lurked in
the shadows.”196
As a result, the historical touchstone for judging the admissibility of
challenged hearsay at a modern trial is not the state of English evidence
law in 1791. And the question is not whether a given piece of hearsay
promotes the trial’s search for truth and accuracy. Instead, the question
is “whether the admission of disputed evidence furthers the
constitutionally protected adversary system by guaranteeing the accused
the right to challenge that evidence.”197
Alas, this touchstone is tricky to use. The Supreme Court has never
interpreted the Sixth Amendment as barring all hearsay, and lines must
be drawn somewhere. As is true of so many constitutional phrases, the
correct application of the Confrontation Clause to modern problems—
even if one puts the clause in its proper context—is not obvious.198
194. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 82–84, 92, 94, 96,109 (1995).
195. Id. at 164. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply
to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998) (articulating a far narrower vision of
who counts as a “witness” under the Confrontation Clause).
196. Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 209, 220 (2005).
197. Jonakait, supra note 194, at 168; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to
Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 616–17 (1992).
198. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1643
(2009) (“The drafters and ratifiers of the Confrontation Clause left little direct evidence of what
they intended to require; the clause comes to us, the Justices have noted, ‘on faded
parchment.’”) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988)).
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Hearsay law was unsettled in 1791, and we lack good records of
ratification-era trials. The proper treatment of a DNA analysis report
offered without giving the accused the opportunity to confront the
author of the report cannot be discerned from a close reading of
historical texts; reasonable persons may disagree about whether the
admission of the report violates the Confrontation Clause. The same
may be said for the traditional coconspirator hearsay exception, which
was viewed with great suspicion by Chief Justice John Marshall.199
Nonetheless, certain cases are easy. The government may not indict
a defendant, take a deposition of a key prosecution witness in secret,
and then admit the deposition transcript at a criminal trial without
producing the witness for cross-examination. The prosecution may,
however, call a witness to repeat the excited utterance made by a
declarant who had no knowledge of any impending criminal
prosecution, much less a desire to bear testimony.
While reasonable persons may draw different lines separating the
hearsay that does and does not violate the Sixth Amendment, coventurer
hearsay falls on the wrong side of any reasonable line. An interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause that allows such hearsay against criminal
defendants (1) would do nothing about one of the worst pieces of
evidence wrongly admitted against Raleigh—the testimony of Dyer
concerning the Portuguese sailor; (2) would expand a hearsay exception
whose traditional, narrower meaning unnerved Chief Justice Marshall
and fomented a Sixth Amendment circuit split nearly two centuries after
ratification; and (3) would undermine the adversary system by opening
American courts to a vast universe of unreliable hearsay. Considering
the historical ambiguity concerning the precise meaning of the clause,200
why interpret it in such a fashion?
B. Modern Practice Shows the Evil of Admitting Coventurer Hearsay
To see the corrosive effect that the joint venture hearsay theory and
the Crawford doctrine produce together upon American criminal justice,
consider again the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case, United States v.
El-Mezain, in which five defendants were convicted of giving money to
Hamas.201 The defendants were sentenced to lengthy prison terms,

199. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 194 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694)
(Marshall, C.J.) (“I have not been able to find in the books a single decision, or a solitary dictum
which would countenance the attempt that is now made to introduce as testimony the
declarations of third persons, made in the absence of the person on trial, under the idea of a
conspiracy, where no conspiracy is alleged in the indictment.”).
200. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is
virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”).
201. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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ranging from fifteen to sixty-five years.202 The case involved “many
years of painstaking investigative and prosecutorial work at the federal,
state and local levels,”203 and it has tremendous importance well beyond
the fate of the five defendants. Several major American charities
(having nothing to do with HLF or its work) filed a brief as amici curiae
arguing that the legal theory underlying the HLF convictions, “if upheld
on appeal, would jeopardize the legitimate charitable work of countless
foundations and charities throughout the United States.”204 In addition,
the prosecution roiled the American Muslim community.205 If the
government of the United States is to shutter the largest Muslim charity
in the country and send its leaders to prison for decades, it should obtain
convictions with evidence of unquestioned legitimacy. Instead, the
prosecution used the revisionist interpretation of the coconspirator
statement exception to admit unreliable hearsay documents offered to
prove that HLF was the fundraising arm of Hamas in the United
States.206
In its effort to prove that the defendants had directed money to a
terrorist organization,207 the government sought to demonstrate that the
American organization they worked for was linked with Hamas.208
Hamas—a Palestinian political party with varying levels of official
authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—is considered a terrorist
organization by the United States and many other countries, and it is a

202. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land
Foundation Case (May 27, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-nsd519.html.
203. Id.
204. See Amicus Brief of Charities, Foundations, Conflict-Resolution Groups, and
Constitutional Rights Organizations In Support of Defendants and Urging Reversal of
Convictions of Counts 2–10 at 1, United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (No.
09-10560). The amici included the Carter Center, the American Friends Service Committee, and
the Nathan Cummings Foundation. Id. at 29–30.
205. See Goodstein, supra note 1; Holy Land Foundation, MUSLIM LEGAL FUND OF AM.,
http://mlfa.org/holy-land-foundation-hlf (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) (“In an attempt to smear the
entire Muslim community, the Justice Department also released to the media a list of more than
300 Muslim organizations and individuals they consider unindicted co-conspirators. . . . This
potentially criminalizes your Muslim charity.”).
206. See Brief for the United States at 10–11, 22–23, 30, 70–73, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467
(No. 09-10560).
207. The defendants were charged with (among other offenses) providing material support
to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), which makes it a
crime to “knowingly” provide such support. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 485.
208. “HAMAS is an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement in Arabic, Harakat alMuqawamah al-Islamiyya. On October 8, 1997, the U.S. Secretary of State designated HAMAS
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189.” Ashqar v. Holder, 355 Fed.
App’x 705, 708 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Holy
Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 493 F.3d 469, 471 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007).
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federal crime to provide material support to Hamas.209 During the HLF
trial,210 the United States presented dozens of documents found during
searches of the homes of two “unindicted co-conspirators.”211 Although
the documents were found in the homes of Ismail Elbarasse and
Abdelhaleen Masan Ashqar and accordingly came to be known as the
“Elbarasse and Ashqar documents,”212 there is no evidence that
Elbarasse or Ashqar created the documents; indeed, the identity of the
authors is a mystery for at least some of the documents.213
Unlike hearsay documents admissible under Rule 803(6), these
records were not shown by the proponent (that is, the prosecution) to
have been “kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a
business, organization, occupation, or calling,” nor did the prosecution
offer “the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness”
concerning the creation and maintenance of the documents.214 And the
prosecution also did not show that the documents were statements of
agents or servants of the defendants, which would make the documents
party admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).215 Rather, the prosecution
asserted that even though the documents were created before providing
support to Hamas violated United States law in any way—because the
United States had not yet added Hamas to the list of prohibited
recipients of funds—the documents nonetheless qualified as
“statements . . . made . . . during and in furtherance of [a] conspiracy”
between the HLF defendants and the authors of the documents.216 The
“conspiracy” was the joint undertaking to support an organization, the
support of which was fully lawful at the time the statements “in
furtherance” of the project were made.217
209. See generally Times Topics: Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/refere
nce/timestopics/organizations/h/hamas/index.html (last updated May 21, 2012).
210. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the “HLF trial” refer to the second trial, at
which the jury found all five defendants guilty.
211. See Brief for the United States at 70–71, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (No. 09-10560).
212. See id. at 71.
213. See Opening Brief of Appellant Ghassan Elashi (with common issues) at 49 n.28, ElMezain, 664 F.3d 467 (No. 09-10560).
214. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
215. Technically, the statements formerly called “admissions by party-opponents” in the
Federal Rules of Evidence are now called “opposing party’s statements” following the
December 2011 “restyling” of the Rules. See id. 801(d)(2). The Advisory Committee Notes to
the 2011 amendments make clear that “[n]o change in application of the exclusion is intended.”
Id. The old language is still being used by at least some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez,
673 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2012).
216. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); Brief for the United States at 74–78, El-Mezain, 664
F.3d 467 (No. 09-10560); see also Reply Brief for Defendants at 23, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467
(No. 09-10560) (“The government concedes that the Elbarasse and Ashqar documents were
created before 1995, when it became unlawful to support Hamas.”).
217. As it happens, the Palestinian organizations to whom HLF directed money (the
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These documents, which the prosecution did not claim were
admissible pursuant to any hearsay exception other than the coventurer
hearsay exception, were vital to the case against the defendants. As the
United States argued on appeal, “The documents establish that HLF was
the Palestine Committee’s official fund-raising organization for the
purpose of collecting donations for Hamas, and they specifically
provide that the Palestine Committee would govern HLF’s activities and
that HLF would report to the Committee.”218 Although the Fifth Circuit
accepted many “harmless error” arguments advanced by the prosecution
on appeal,219 the United States did not even argue that the convictions of
the defendants could be upheld if the Elbarasse and Ashqar documents
were not proper evidence.220 The importance of the documents would
preclude a harmless error finding if they were wrongly admitted.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit decision affirming the conviction was justified
in part by the evidence in these documents.221
A reconsideration of the justifications for the traditional
coconspirator exception reveals that none of them, other than perhaps
bare “necessity,” supports the admission of the Elbarasse and Ashqar
documents against the HLF defendants.222 The four arguments raised to
justify the admission against one conspirator of the statements of others
funding that served as the basis of the defendants’ conviction) received funds from the United
States government directly, even after the government shut down HLF and after the defendants
were indicted. See Appellant’s Joint Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d
467 (No. 09-10560). Of course, the United States government is free to criminalize private
donations to entities that the government supports, albeit not without raising eyebrows.
218. See Brief for the United States at 73, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (No. 09-10560).
Lawyers for the United States made a similar argument with respect to joint venture hearsay in
another terrorist financing case. See United States v. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, No. 07-00087CR-W-NKL, 2009 WL 3062175 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2009); Government’s Response in
Opposition to Joint Motion at 7, Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 2009 WL 3062175 (“[I]t is
sufficient if the statements are the result of his involvement in a legal or illegal joint
venture[.]”).
219. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 525–35.
220. See Brief for the United States at 69, 94, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (No. 09-10560)
(arguing that various alleged trial errors were harmless); id. at 70–78 (discussing admission of
Elbarasse and Ashqar documents under coventurer hearsay theory without asserting harmless
error).
221. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 534 (recounting trial evidence that “the 1991 Elbarasse
No. 22 letter . . . indicated that Hamas controlled the zakat [Muslim charity] committee” and
that “[e]vidence seized from HLF included a letter . . . addressed to the Ramallah Zakat
Committee’s director . . . whose name and telephone number also appeared along with several
other people identified as Hamas members on a list seized from Elbarasse’s home”); see also
Jason J. Kilborn, Foundations of Forgiveness in Islamic Bankruptcy Law: Sources,
Methodology, Diversity, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 323, 357–58 (2011) (discussing principles of
zakat).
222. See supra Subsection II.A.1 (discussing traditional justifications for the coconspirator
exception).
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made in furtherance of their common illegal schemes are (1) an analogy
to agency theory, (2) an analogy to verbal acts or res gestae, (3) the
assertion that coconspirator hearsay is reliable in a way similar to
statements within other hearsay exceptions, and (4) an appeal to
necessity, claiming that without such evidence many conspirators would
go unpunished. The first three arguments have no application to the
Elbarasse and Ashqar documents.
Agency analogy. The prosecution did not allege, much less prove,
that the authors of the documents (whoever they may have been) were
the agents of any of the HLF defendants. Even if somehow the author of
one document were truly proven to have been acting as the agent of one
of the HLF defendants, the document would have been good evidence
only against that defendant, not against the others.223 The other
defendants would have been entitled to a limiting instruction to the
effect that the evidence could be considered by the jury only against the
“principal,” and they might well have been entitled to separate trials
because of the importance of the documents to the prosecution case.224
“Verbal acts” analogy. Because the documents were not made in
furtherance of any illegal venture, they cannot plausibly be described as
res gestae (the “thing itself”) of crime. For example, one of the Ashqar
documents relied upon by the Fifth Circuit was titled “Important phone
and fax numbers. Palestine Section/Outside America.”225 In the infancy
of the coconspirator hearsay exception, commentators analogized such
hearsay to res gestae because certain coconspirator statements were
truly criminal in nature, such as a letter urging a foreign enemy to
invade.226 Compiling a contact list for a legal organization is not a
verbal act in any sense of the term.
Reliability. The prosecution cannot identify the authors of the
Elbarasse and Ashqar documents, nor can it produce a witness
concerning the creation or maintenance of the records. The documents
therefore lack the indications of reliability required for the admission of
ordinary business records such as telephone bills or pay stubs.227
Further, the United States alleges that the documents were made in
223. See FED. R. EVID. 105; Daniel J. Capra, Instructions on Admissions for a Limited
Purpose, 211 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Mar. 11, 1994).
224. See United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1129–30 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 946–48 (2d Cir. 1980); Castro v. United States, 296 F.2d 540, 543 (5th
Cir. 1961).
225. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 528.
226. See, e.g., Trial of William Lord Russell, 9 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 577, 604 (1683);
see also Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and
Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 325–26 (1984).
227. See Pierce v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 444 (7th Cir. 1997);
FED. R. EVID. 803(6); Charles V. Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IOWA L. REV. 276
(1961).
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furtherance of a shadowy scheme aimed at the secret diversion of
purported charitable funds into terrorist coffers.228 Accordingly, such
hearsay should be considered no more reliable than most statements
uttered by criminals, whom sensible persons do not deem more credible
than law-abiding citizens whose out-of-court utterances are traditionally
excluded from evidence by the hearsay rule.
Necessity. All that is left is necessity—the difficulty of convicting
certain defendants without the desired evidence—which is the only
justification of the traditional coconspirator exception to withstand
sustained scrutiny.229 If necessity, crude as it may seem, is sufficient to
justify a longstanding hearsay exception such as that for coconspirator
hearsay, why may it not then serve to justify the expansion of the
exception to statements made in furtherance of lawful ventures? The
answer is that as is the case for other party admissions, the use of
coconspirator hearsay is made palatable by a theory of desert, which
holds that a conspirator may fairly suffer the use against him of the
unreliable out-of-court statements of his confederates because he
deserves such harms (and more) by virtue of his decision to join a
conspiracy. An example using other forms of party admissions
illustrates the importance of desert to Rule 801(d)(2).
Imagine that the rollercoaster at Awesome Amusements speeds out
of control, causing severe injuries to children on the ride. Hours after
the accident, a parent of one of the accident victims overhears Casey
Jones, an Awesome Amusements employee say, “I really shouldn’t
have shown up high on cocaine on the day I was in charge of the
rollercoaster. I’ve got trouble ahead.”230 The injured child sues Casey
Jones, Awesome Amusements, and Jerry Garcia, another Awesome
Amusements employee, whom the plaintiff alleges was also negligent
on the day of the accident. Jones’s “high on cocaine” hearsay would be
admissible against Jones because it is his own statement.231 And it
would be admissible against his employer, Awesome Amusements,
because it was “made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter
228. See Brief for the United States at 7–8, El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (No.
09-10560) (Jan. 28, 2011) (“Appellant Holy Land Foundation . . . was founded and operated for
the purpose of raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas . . . . From the founding
of Hamas and HLF in the late 1980s, HLF supported Hamas by raising millions of dollars for
the movement and distributing proceeds to Hamas-controlled entities in the West Bank and
Gaza.”).
229. See supra Subsection II.A.1.
230. Note that despite the implication by the Grateful Dead in their “Casey Jones” song,
the actual John Luther “Casey” Jones died heroically, attempting to save lives in a train accident
unrelated to drug use. See MASSENA F. JONES, THE CHOO-CHOO STOPPED AT VAUGHAN (1979);
GRATEFUL DEAD, Casey Jones, on WORKINGMAN’S DEAD (Warner Bros. 1970) (“Driving that
train, high on cocaine / Casey Jones you better watch your speed.”).
231. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
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within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.”232 It would
probably not, however, be admissible against Garcia, unless somehow
Jones was found to have been Garcia’s agent, or Garcia somehow
ratified Jones’s words.233
This result, that the statement can be used against two defendants
but not against the third,234 cannot be explained by reliability. Jones
either spoke accurately or he did not; the answer does not depend on the
person against whom his words will be used at trial. The explanation is
that anything Jones says “can and will be used against him in a court of
law,” a maxim more commonly associated with criminal cases but
nonetheless widely understood. He said it; let him explain it. And
although Awesome Amusements did not “say it” exactly, it did hire
Jones and take responsibility for his actions while on the job. After all,
the liability of the company for Jones’s negligent operation of the
amusement ride depends on the theory of respondeat superior. It is but a
small leap from a substantive rule that the employer should be
responsible for the actions of its employee to the evidentiary rule that
the employer should be confronted with the words of its employee.
Garcia, on the other hand, just works there. He does not control
Jones’s words or deeds. Just as he cannot be held vicariously liable
should Jones be found to have acted negligently, he does not deserve to
face the out-of-court statements with which Jones may have hanged
himself and his employer. Unless Jones’s statement meets the standard
of a hearsay exception justified by reliability (such as an excited
utterance), the admission of Jones’s words against Garcia would be
unjust, and evidence law does not allow it.
The concept of desert also explains the Confrontation Clause
procedure known as the Bruton Doctrine, which often prevents the use
of one codefendant’s confession at a trial when such evidence is
inadmissible against other defendants.235 For example, imagine that
Jones and Garcia were jointly tried for the crime of reckless
endangerment. Jones, failing again to keep his mouth shut, tells police
before trial, “Garcia and I were both high on cocaine on the day of the
accident.” The confession would be properly admissible against Jones
(he said it; let him explain it) but not against Garcia. A limiting
instruction such as “the jury shall not consider the Jones confession as
232. See id. 801(d)(2)(D).
233. See id. 801(d)(2)(B).
234. It is possible that Jones’s statements could be found admissible against any party as a
“statement against interest.” This would require, however, that Jones be unavailable at trial. See
id. 804(b)(3).
235. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968); see also CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 1.15, at 91–92
(1999).
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evidence against Mr. Garcia” would be insufficient to protect Garcia’s
rights under the Sixth Amendment.236 To use the statement against
Jones, the prosecution must either consent to separate trials or otherwise
ensure that the jury deciding Garcia’s case hears no mention of Jones’s
statement concerning Garcia.237 These constitutional constraints on the
use of Jones’s statements are not based on reliability. If Jones’s words
are reliable at his own trial, they are reliable at Garcia’s. The
explanation is that despite the uncertain reliability of Jones—some
people lie to police, others speak truth, and the traditional sorting
method at trial involves cross-examination, not a blanket assumption of
accuracy—evidence law and constitutional law allow Jones’s words to
be used against him because he brought his problems upon himself
when he opened his mouth.
Another illustration of the disconnect between coventurer hearsay
and the normal theory of desert underlying the coconspirator exception
was presented by the recent trial of Senator John Edwards for campaign
finance crimes. The Edwards trial concerned money paid by supporters
to help Edwards placate and hide his mistress, Rielle Hunter, whom
Edwards had impregnated.238 Federal prosecutors argued that they could
offer against Edwards any statement made in furtherance of the goal of
electing Edwards to the presidency of the United States.239 A
prosecution brief referred to “a common goal among . . . Edwards [and
others] to keep Rielle Hunter happy and out of the spotlight in order to
protect Edwards’ candidacy” and argued that statements “made in
furtherance of that joint effort fall within the scope of Rule
801(d)(2)(E).”240 If this theory is correct, such statements would be
admissible against any member of the Edwards campaign—including
volunteers; the declarants at issue were not campaign staff members—
because coconspirator statements may be used against all members of a
conspiracy, not only the leader.241
236. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190–91, 193 (1987); see also United States v.
Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 739 (8th Cir. 2001); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 235, § 8.28,
at 1101. Garcia could not confront Jones about the statement unless Jones waived his Fifth
Amendment rights and chose to testify at trial.
237. For example, the court might empanel two juries, removing the Garcia jury from the
courtroom when the Jones confession is offered as evidence. Or the statement could be redacted,
reading something like, “I [was] high on cocaine on the day of the accident.” See Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 235, § 8.28, at 1101–
02.
238. See Kim Severson, Defense Rests in Edwards Trial Without Having Called Major
Players to the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2012, at A20.
239. See Government’s Motion in Limine at 7, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:11-CR161-1-CCE, 2012 WL 628691 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 15, 2012).
240. Id.
241. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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It might make sense to offer against Edwards statements made by
his campaign employees, and perhaps even low-level volunteers
shaking hands in Iowa, because such persons may fairly be described as
“agents” of a candidate running for president. Edwards had the ability to
fire campaign staff and volunteers; they worked for him. Accordingly,
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) might allow admission of the statements under the
principal–agent exception to the hearsay rule. But surely it cannot be
correct that if someone volunteers to canvass for a presidential
campaign in Iowa, she is on the hook for any statements made by her
“coconspirators” shaking hands and kissing babies in New Hampshire.
Edwards’s prosecutors would go even further, exposing these low-level
volunteers to statements made by campaign supporters who gave money
and took Hunter shopping with the goal of helping the candidate.242
As in the Walter Raleigh trial, the hearsay admitted in the Holy
Land Foundation case offends Anglo-American notions of fair play and
substantial justice because (1) the evidence bears no hallmarks of
reliability that distinguish it from commonly inadmissible out-of-court
statements, and (2) the defendants have committed no unlawful act that
makes them “deserve” to face unreliable evidence in court. When
Raleigh’s alleged coconspirator, Cobham, confessed, Raleigh demanded
the right to confront the witness in open court. The court’s denial of that
request earned it an ignominious reputation that endures centuries later,
as the Crawford Court duly noted.243 Similarly, when the ship’s pilot
Dyer recounted the alleged statements of an unnamed Portuguese
gentleman, Raleigh did not bother demanding the right to cross-examine
the declarant because the court could not have produced the
“gentleman” even if it had desired to do so. Cobham’s written
confession was not especially reliable, nor was the gossip recounted by
Dyer. Other than his status as a person charged with serious crimes,
nothing about Raleigh merited the admission against him of such
questionable evidence. In the HLF trial, the prosecution offered dozens
of documents absent any knowledge of who created them, how they
might have been altered since then, and whether whoever wrote them
was especially knowledgeable about their subjects. These documents
are no more reliable than others commonly rejected as hearsay unable to
fit within the scope of the business records exception. And other than
their status as persons charged with serious crimes, the HLF defendants
had done nothing to merit the admission against them of such
questionable evidence. Indeed, the United States concedes that the

242. See Government’s Motion in Limine, supra note 239, at 4. The prosecution’s brief
cited the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in El-Mezain to support this theory. Id. at 6.
243. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373–74 (1768)).
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documents were created before it was even possible to violate the ban
on funding Hamas.
The Roberts doctrine accepted the traditional coconspirator hearsay
exception as “firmly rooted” and allowed the use of coconspirator
hearsay against criminal defendants. But the expansion of the exception
to include statements in furtherance of lawful joint ventures almost
certainly would have been deemed a Confrontation Clause violation had
Roberts survived when courts began adopting the revisionist
interpretation of the coconspirator hearsay exception. As the Holy Land
Foundation case illustrates, the failure of Crawford to exclude hearsay
that Roberts likely would have barred from criminal trials demonstrates
a vital weakness in the Court’s new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Put simply, the new doctrine allows significant injustices that the old
doctrine would have prevented. If the Court continues to confine the
Confrontation Clause to testimonial hearsay, it must find some other
method—perhaps through the Due Process Clauses—to exclude
coventurer hearsay from criminal trials. To the extent that the Justices
continue to tweak the definition of testimonial, they should endeavor to
find a way to include unreliable statements in furtherance of perfectly
lawful joint undertakings in the list of hearsay excluded by the Sixth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause interpretation set forth in Crawford v.
Washington allows significant injustices that the discarded doctrine of
Ohio v. Roberts would have prevented. Refuting claims that Crawford
is perhaps wrong as a historical matter but sound as a practical matter,
the example of coventurer hearsay proves that in at least some cases,
Crawford allows formerly prohibited evidence (in the form of out-ofcourt statements by declarants whom a defendant cannot confront) into
criminal trials despite (1) the absence of any good arguments for its
reliability compared to excluded hearsay, and (2) the absence of any
good arguments that the defendants “deserve” to face such evidence
because of their own conduct. The Court should correct the deficiencies
of the Crawford doctrine before it allows unreliable hearsay to further
infect American criminal trials.

